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Shifting the Scope:
How Taking School Demographics Into Account
in College Admissions Could Reduce K-12 Segregation
Nationwide
by Thomas Scott-Railton*
Deepening racial and socioeconomic segregation is producing unequal educa-
tional outcomes at the K-12 level, outcomes that are then reproduced in higher
education. This is particularly true as rising competition among colleges has led
many of them to focus increasingly on measures of merit that correlate with in-
come and as parents and students adjust their behavior in light of those metrics.
While existing affirmative action programs at colleges provide some counterweight
to this dynamic, they are limited by institutional (and constitutional) constraints.
Out of concern for revenue and rankings, many colleges are constrained in the
number of students from low-income backgrounds they are willing to admit. Such
a limited scope is not inevitable, however.
If colleges were to give a substantial admissions bonus to applicants who had
attended K-12 schools with at least a certain percentage of low-income students,
higher education could become a force for countering inequality at the K-12 level,
instead of reproducing it. College admissions policies serve as a crucial reference
point for parents, students, and educators on down through K-12. By rewarding
applicants for attending socioeconomically integrated schools, colleges would mo-
bilize the resources of private actors across the country towards integration. The
benefits of this would be significant, especially for students from low-income fami-
lies who would have an increased chance of attending integrated K-12 schools as a
result. Such a policy would also help colleges better foster diversity on campuses, as
more students would have had prior experience in integrated settings.
This Note explores the ongoing problem of K-12 re-segregation, argues that
by adopting this policy colleges could work to promote integration, examines how
such a policy could best be designed to do so, and addresses why such a policy
would be constitutional. At a time when educational inequality is on the rise,
there is an urgent need for new affirmative action proposals that can combat seg-
regation and do so within colleges' existing constitutional and institutional con-
straints. The policy proposal advocated in this Note would do both, interrupting
key elements of the present vicious circle.
* J.D. Candidate, Yale Law School, expected 2018. Thanks to Muneer Ahmad, Sam
Brill, Tomiko Brown-Nagin, Sarah Burack, Sam Erman, James Forman, Jr., Daniel
Markovits, Reva Siegel, John Fabian Witt, and Nancy Yun Tang for their thought-
ful feedback on this piece.
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INTRODUCTION
After reaching a peak of integration in 1988, segregation at the K-12 level
across the United States has deepened for many students along both economic
and racial lines.' This re-segregation leads to unequal educational outcomes and
1. For deepening racial segregation, see Gary Orfield et al., Brown at 62: School Segre-
gation by Race, Poverty, and State, UCLA C.R. PROJECT/PROYECTO DERS. CIVILES 3






can result in greater isolation between racial groups and socioeconomic statuses
(SES).' Higher education compounds these problems. 3 College 4 admissions re-
produce racial and socioeconomic inequality at the K- 12 level by focusing on
measures of merit that correlate with income.5 The resulting under-
representation of students from low-income backgrounds on campuses means
that these will tend to be less inclusive environments for such students.6 And
the rising competitiveness in college admissions further accelerates segregation
at the K- 12 level. 7 The relationship of colleges to rising educational inequality is
[http://perma.cc/LJB3-9HSC] [hereinafter Orfield et al., Brown at 62], which
states that, "during the quarter century since the high point in 1988, the share of
intensely segregated nonwhite schools (which we defined as those schools with on-
ly 0-10% white students) more than tripled, rising from 5.7% to 18.6% of all pub-
lic schools." For increasing economic segregation, see Ann Owens, Sean F. Rear-
don & Christopher Jencks, Income Segregation Between Schools and School Districts,
53 AM. EDUC. RES. J. 1159, 1181-83 (2016), which finds that for families with chil-
dren enrolled in public school, segregation by family income between school dis-
tricts increased by over 15 percent between 1990 and 2010, while family income
segregation within the 100 largest school districts in the country increased by
about 40 percent during that same time. The overlap of racial and economic dis-
advantage creates a situation of "double segregation." Gary Orfield et al., E Pluri-
bus ... Separation: Deepening Double Segregation for More Students, UCLA C.R.
PROJECT/PROYECTO DERS. CIVILES ix (2012), http://civilrightsproject.ucla
.edu/research/k- 12-education/integration-and-diversity/mlk-national/e-
pluribus... separation-deepening-double-segregation-for-more-students/orfield
.epluribus revisedcomplete_2012.pdf [http://perma.cc/3MUM-N2ZT] [herein-
after Orfield et al., E Pluribus], (noting, among other measures, that "[i]n the early
2000s, the average Latino and black student attended a school where a little over
half of the students were low income (as measured by free and reduced price lunch
eligibility), but now attend schools where low income students account for nearly
two-thirds of their classmates"). However, while race and socioeconomic status
are two of the most prevalent forms of disadvantage, they are not alone. Non-
native English speakers suffer discrimination in educational settings. Id. at xv (de-
scribing discrimination by language as "deeply harmful triple segregation"). In ad-
dition, students with disabilities also face forms of educational segregation. See
Wayne S. Sailor & Amy B. McCart, Stars in Alignment, 39 RES. & PRAC. FOR
PERSONS WITH SEVERE DISABILITIES 55 (2014) (describing the history of separate
education for individuals with disabilities and recent efforts to provide for more
inclusive educational environments).
2. See infra Section I.A.
3. See infra Section I.B.
4. I use the term "college" to refer to institutions of higher education in general.
5. See infra Section I.B.
6. See Tomiko Brown-Nagin, Rethinking Proxies for Disadvantage in Higher Educa-
tion: A First Generation Students' Project, 2014 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 433, 472.
7. See infra Section I.B.
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therefore part symptom and part cause within the context of a broader educa-
tional system.
While colleges have adopted affirmative action programs to help increase
racial and socioeconomic diversity on their campuses, the extent to which such
programs counteract the unequal outcomes at the K-12 level is limited. This
partly reflects boundaries imposed by the Supreme Court's jurisprudence on
race-conscious affirmative action.9 But even outside of the constitutional limits
on race-conscious affirmative action, there are deep institutional constraints on
how willing colleges will be to admit students from low-income or first-
generation professional (FGP) backgrounds.o
So while the Supreme Court's recent decision in Fisher II,n in which the
Court upheld a race-conscious affirmative action program at the University of
Texas, represented a victory for advocates of admissions programs that help
students from historically underrepresented backgrounds receive college educa-
tions, the framework that the Court sanctioned remains limited in the same
ways as before; so long as the pool of applicants reflects the considerable racial
and economic disparities at the K-12 level, college efforts to promote diversity
and reduce educational inequality by admitting individual applicants will neces-
sarily be limited. Such a limited scope is not inevitable, however. There is great-
er room within existing legal and institutional constraints for colleges to reduce
the contribution of higher education to rising inequality. This paper offers an
example of such an approach. If colleges were to adopt an admissions program
that rewarded applicants for attending a K- 12 school' with a percentage of low-
income students above a certain threshold, they could both promote K- 12 inte-
gration" nationwide and better foster an atmosphere of inclusion 4 on their own
campuses. The main focus of this paper will be the pressing problem this pro-
gram aims to address, how such a program would work, and whether it would
be legal.
In Section I, I will describe the problems that this policy seeks to address
and in general terms how it would do so. This policy seeks to help turn the tide
8. See infra Section I.B.
9. See infra Section IV.A.
10. See infra notes 60-84 and accompanying text.
n1. Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin (Fisher ll), 136 S. Ct. 2198 (2016).
12. While I often use the term "K-12" as shorthand in this piece, this program could
certainly be expanded to include pre-K as well.
13. By "integration," I refer to the degree to which these schools have meaningful per-
centages of students from different income backgrounds.
14. By "inclusion," I mean not just the numerical diversity on a campus, but also the
amount of positive intergroup contact on that campus, particularly with regards
to students from historically underrepresented backgrounds. For a more in-depth
discussion of how recruiting students with a history of intergroup contact would




of deepening K-12 segregation. By shifting the unit from "applicant" to the
"school the applicant attended," colleges could systematically shift incentives in
favor of integration at the K-12 level. College admissions articulate norms of
educational merit and influence the decisions and values of millions of parents
and students across the country. By using the admissions process to reward stu-
dents who attended K-12 schools with over a certain threshold of low-income
students, colleges would create an incentive in favor of integration at three lev-
els: (i) it would create an incentive for middle-class-and-up parents to enroll
their children in socioeconomically integrated schools, (ii) it would serve as an
incentive pushing against the ongoing re-segregation of currently integrated
school districts, and (iii) it would provide an incentive for private schools to en-
roll more low-income students.
Moreover, by stimulating integration at the K-12 level, colleges could im-
prove the education of far more students than those who directly received an
admissions boost, as students across the nation will benefit from more integrat-
ed educations. If it were to be successfully implemented, the primary beneficiar-
ies of this plan would be low-income students who had a greater chance of at-
tending K-12 schools with larger percentages of middle- and high-income stu-
students, the benefits of which can be significant." These students would also
benefit at the college admissions level, as they would receive the admission
boost in question. Others who would stand to gain would be the middle- and
high-income students who attended K-12 schools with above a certain thresh-
old of low-income students. They would benefit from both the admissions
boost and the experience of attending a more integrated school.'"
In Section II, I will explore how this program could best be designed to
further the goals of encouraging K-12 desegregation and improving inclusion
on college campuses. I will argue that the best way to structure this policy would
be for colleges to grant an admissions bonus to applicants who, for over six
15. Richard D. Kahlenberg, Socioeconomic School Integration, 85 N.C. L. REV. 1545,
1549-50 (2007) (describing the benefits for low-income students of attending
schools at the level of peer effect, increased parental engagement, and greater abil-
ity to attract better teachers); Fractured: The Breakdown of America's School Dis-
tricts, EDBUILD 8 (June 2017), http://edbuild.org/content/fractured/fractured-full-
report.pdf [http://perma.cc/6VRR-MJ9A] (noting the benefits for low-income
students of being educated in schools with higher income students, which extend
well beyond "mere proximity" but also to the resources that often accompany such
students); Orfield et al., E Pluribus, supra note 1, at 7, 9-11 (noting the positive ac-
ademic peer effects for low-income students of being educated alongside middle-
to-high income students); Amy Stuart Wells, Lauren Fox & Diana Cordova-Cobo,
How Integrated Classrooms Can Benefit All Students, CENTURY FOUND. (Feb. 9,
2016), http://tcf.org/assets/downloads/HowRaciallyDiverseAmyStuartWells.pdf
[http://perma.cc/PT5A-TUFW] (describing the significant benefits, both cognitive
and interpersonal, of attending socioeconomically integrated schools).
16. The benefits for these students of attending more integrated schools will be dis-
cussed at length in Section II.B.
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years, attended a school at which over 40 percent of the students were eligible
for Free or Reduced Price Lunches (FRPL), contingent upon the school meeting
a context-specific standard for intraschool integration.
In addition to the benefits for these students, colleges also have an incentive
to adopt such a policy, which I will discuss in Section III. Existing pipeline af-
firmative action programs are limited in their ability to create an inclusive envi-
ronment on college campuses. Drawing students with lengthy experiences in
integrated schools, by contrast, would help facilitate a more inclusive atmos-
phere on campus and in classrooms, as well as produce graduates better suited
to leadership positions in an increasingly diverse and international economy.17
Colleges have long recognized these pedagogical benefits of diversity. Why then
wouldn't colleges take into account these benefits when it comes to the K-12
educations applicants received? Surely these benefits are just as important at
eight as at eighteen.'" Since such a program could help spur integration at the
K-12 level, colleges would benefit again down the road, as a greater absolute
number of applicants will have attended integrated schools. By implementing
this program, colleges can show that they are serious about their wider social
commitments. At a time when these institutions are under sustained criticism
for failing to live up to those commitments,'9 I suggest that they will find such a
program particularly appealing. And unlike other proposals to increase inclu-
sion on campus or to increase integration at the K- 12 level-which would work
symbiotically with this program-the approach advocated by this piece would
cost very little, if anything at all.
To be sure, even reversing re-segregation at the K-12 level cannot fully
remedy the structural disparities in resources and opportunities experienced by
low-income students and many students of color.2 0 Increasing socioeconomic
and racial integration is but one step in producing a more equitable educational
17. See infra Section II.B.
18. See infra notes 170-178 and accompanying text.
19. To give just one example, Yale's President recently stated in an interview about
higher education and inequality- "There is no doubt that the distribution of wealth
in this country is disturbing to this generation of students. But in my view, univer-
sities can and should be part of the solution." David Cole, Race & Renaming: A
Talk with Peter Salovey, President of Yale, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, June.9, 2016, at 43. The
willingness of institutions to address these concerns is reflected in the number of
colleges who have signed on to projects that seek to coordinate efforts to improve
access for low-income and first-generation professional students, including the
University Innovation Alliance (which includes the Presidents of eleven major
public universities, including Ohio State and the University of Texas at Austin)
and the American Talent Initiative (which includes thirty "leading Ivy League,
state flagship, private universities and liberal arts colleges"). See Who We Are, AM.
TALENT INITIATIVE, http://americantalentinitiative.org/who-we-are [http://perma
.cc/VX7L-KS3D]; Who We Are, UNIv. INNOVATION ALL., http://www.theuia.org
[http://perma.cc/Z2RZ-5RZD].




system and society. Yet it is a crucial one, with the potential for widespread im-
provement, as "[t]here is not a city or a region where diversity could not be fos-
tered in some ways."" The policy advocated in this piece would thus be an am-
bitious move by colleges towards greater educational equality across the board.
Nonetheless, it also represents a compromise with some of the institutional
constraints facing colleges. Part of what would make this policy feasible for col-
leges concerned about prestige and tuition dollars is that, particularly at the
outset, the students colleges would admit from socioeconomically integrated
schools would be more likely to be those from more affluent backgrounds. This
is imperfect from the perspective of increasing equality in higher education. On
the other hand, until colleges are willing to disregard the aforementioned insti-
tutional constraints, they will continue to admit sizeable numbers of affluent
students-the difference being that with the policy advocated here, the re-
sources and presence of these affluent students will have been channeled
through integrated schools, with substantial benefits for a much greater number
of low-income students than colleges are currently prepared to help directly.'
The fact that at the college level, many of the admissions benefits will flow ini-
tially to more affluent students is unquestionably a drawback. However, it is
one that would make the benefits of such a plan, which I believe outweigh it
considerably, possible.
And last, in Section IV I will address whether such a program would be
constitutional. I conclude that, to the extent that it focused on income rather
than race, it likely would be. Saving the legal question for last reflects a broader
decision to step back from the primarily legal debates in the scholarship by ex-
amining affirmative action programs from the "outside in," drawing on social
science and education policy research.23 The emphasis in much of the literature
on the legal doctrine is essential in some ways but limiting in others." While a
focus on the legal framework has tended to overshadow broader policy discus-
sions, recent scholarship, both legal and non-legal, has begun to explore what
other programs might be possible within the space left by the Supreme Court's
affirmative action jurisprudence. 5 Yet much of this work has nonetheless re-
mained within the limiting framework of pipeline mobility, in which equality is
pursued primarily through the admission of individual students to institutions
of higher education.' This paper contributes to this ongoing discussion by pre-
21. Id. at xxii.
22. See infra Section I.C.
23. Brown-Nagin, supra note 6, at 435-36.
z4. See id. at 435 ("The furious legal debate over affirmative action tends to crowd out
conversation about the overall direction of higher education and policy and how
educational disadvantage fits within it.").
25. See infra Section IV.
26. See, e.g., Lani Guinier, Admissions Rituals as Political Acts: Guardians at the Gates of
Our Democratic Ideals, 117 HARV. L. REv. 113, 144 (2003) (describing the idea of
225
YALE LAW & POLICY REVIEW
senting a novel program that will pursue the original policy goals of affirmative
action programs-promoting both diversity (and thus inclusion) and social
mobility (and thus equality)"-but doing so in a systematic way that aims to
benefit many more students than simply those who are admitted to the colleges
that adopt such a program.
I. How THIS PROGRAM COULD HELP REVERSE INCREASING K-12 SEGREGA-
TION
A. The Re-segregation of K-12 Education
Overall, both racial and socioeconomic segregation in K-12 education are
on the rise.? A recent report by the Government Accountability Office identi-
fied "a large increase in schools that are the most isolated by poverty and
race." 9 For example, from 2001 to 2014, the percentage of K-12 public schools
"contest" and "sponsorship" mobility and the limitations of both); Sarah E. Red-
field, The Educational Pipeline to Law School-Too Broken and Too Narrow To Pro-
vide Diversity, 8 PIERCE L. REV. 347, 358-59 (2010) (containing an analogous dis-
cussion of why pipeline affirmative action programs are insufficient at the law
school level given that the achievement gap for underrepresented students will
have started so much earlier in their education).
27. Brown-Nagin, supra note 6, at 435-44 (citing "the national commitment to social
mobility originally embraced by the Civil Rights Act, the Equal Opportunity Act,
and early iterations of affirmative action"). As Professor Brown-Nagin describes,
correcting for "disproportionate poverty caused by slavery and Jim Crow or the ef-
fects of discrimination in the labor market and in education" was a core element
of both the civil rights movement's demands and crucial civil-rights era legislation.
Id. at 438. New government agencies, created and/or empowered by this legisla-
tion, along with activists, lawyers, and, for a time, the courts, pushed affirmative
action as a means of furthering economic equality in both employment and educa-
tion. Id. at 439-441. This conception of affirmative action, as a remedy for societal
inequality, was forced into retreat by political and legal shifts. Id. at 443-66.
28. See supra note 1; see also Sarah Childress, Report: School Segregation Is Back, 60
Years After "Brown," PBS (May 15, 2014), http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/frontline/
article/report-school-segregation-is-back-60-years-after-brown [http://perma.cc/
8X7B-RQU3] (describing how since 1988, "the overall trend has been toward re-
segregation"); Erica Frankenberg et al., Southern Schools More Than a Half-
Century After the Civil Rights Revolution, UCLA C.R. PROJECT/PROYECTO DERS.
CIVILES (May 2017), http://www.civilrightsproject.ucla.edu/research/k-12
-education/integration-and-diversity/southern-schools-brown-83-report/Brown
63_South_052317-RELEASE-VERSION.pdf [http://perma.cc/7WJL-ZDSC] (de-
scribing the re-segregation of southern schools).
29. U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-16-345, K-12 EDUCATION: BETTER USE OF
INFORMATION COULD HELP AGENCIES IDENTIFY DISPARITIES AND ADDRESS RACIAL





that were both high poverty3o and comprised of mostly black and Hispanic stu-
dents31 increased from 9 percent to 16 percent.32 And even beyond the trend
lines, the absolute number of students in schools that are almost entirely black
and Latinx and low-income is reason enough to be concerned: a recent report
by the Civil Rights Project/Proyecto Derechos Civiles found that 43 percent of
Latinx students and 38 percent of black studentS33 are concentrated in "intense-
ly segregated" schools where between 90-100 percent of the students are mem-
bers of one or the other minority group.34 These schools are also strongly corre-
lated with concentrated poverty.35 Such racially and socioeconomically isolated
schools tend to offer fewer resources and opportunities to their students and to
produce correspondingly unequal educational outcomes.3' These schools also
tend to have more trouble recruiting and retaining high-quality teachers, have
higher rates of discipline and expulsion, and have lower graduation rates.37 In
addition to finding considerable overlap between the disadvantages facing stu-
dents who attend majority-minority schools and those who attend schools with
a predominantly low-socioeconomic-status student body, research indicates
that attending either of such schools is a significantly stronger predictor of
achievement outcomes than individual race or socioeconomic status.3' This fur-
ther supports the focus on schools as a particularly fitting locus of intervention
against both racial and socioeconomic inequality.
This ongoing re-segregation is driven in part by the fact -that affluent white
and Asian parents often seek to send their children to schools with few low-
income students and few black and Latinx students.39 Such parents tend to as-
30. "High poverty" is defined as having a student body in which over 75% or the stu-
dents are eligible for free or reduced price lunches. Id.
31. The GAO defines "mostly black and Hispanic" to mean schools comprised of over
75% black and Hispanic students. Id.
32. Id.
33. Orfield et al., E Pluribus, supra note 1, at 9 (finding that "80% of Latino students
and 74% of black students remained in majority nonwhite schools, while 43% of
Latinos and 38% of blacks attended intensely segregated schools").
34. Id. at 27.
35. Id. (finding a .85 correlation between the combined percentages of black and
Latinx students and the percentage of poor students).
36. Id. at 6.
37. Id. at 6-9.
38. See Geoffrey D. Borman & Maritza Dowling, Schools and Inequality: A Multilevel
Analysis of Coleman's Equality of Educational Opportunity Data, 112 TCHRS. C.
REc. 1201, 1236 (2010).
39. See infra notes 107-111 and accompanying text. Increasing racial segregation is
also caused in part by the increasing Latinx school-age population. See Orfield et
al., E Pluribus, supra note 1, at 14-27 (detailing how the percentage of students in
public schools who are Latinx has risen from 5.1% in 1970-71 to 22.8% in 2009-
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sume that schools with significant numbers of low-income and black and
Latinx students will have fewer resources, offer inferior teaching and facilities,
and will be less safe, among other things.40 And to the extent that re-segregation
leads to racial and economic disadvantage becoming increasingly concentrated
in segregated schools, with the effects noted above, this can create a self-
reinforcing dynamic whereby increasing segregation creates its own justifica-
tion. In contrast, affluent communities have the resources to provide extra
money to schools to ensure that they meet parents' definitions of high quality.4 '
Nonetheless, it would be naive to think that segregation is caused solely by
parents objectively appraising the relative merits of schools. Indeed, there is
some evidence that white parents weigh a school's demographics more than its
academics, even when they have evidence on both." Affluent parents appear to
be particularly concerned with social status when selecting schools for their
children. 43 While each community, family, and individual makes their own de-
cisions for their own reasons,"4 they have done so within a broader systemic
context that includes residential white flight,45 metropolitan fragmentation (the
10). While this demographic shift has also led to some predominantly white
schools enrolling more Latinx students, as a whole Latinx students are considera-
bly less likely to have white classmates than before. Id. at 23. And black and Latinx
students are increasingly likely to be in schools where the vast majority of students
are black or Latinx and low-income. Id. Thus, on the whole, the result has been in-
creasing racial and economic segregation for black and Latinx students by most
measures. Id. at 17-27.
40. Id.
41. See infra note 109; see also David Orentlicher, Economic Inequality and College
Admissions Policies, 26 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 101, 104 (2016).
42. See note 138 and accompanying text.
43. See Jennifer Jellison Holme, Buying Homes, Buying Schools: School Choice and the
Social Construction of School Quality, 72 HARv. EDUC. REv. 177, 179-81 (2002).
44. See, e.g., Kate Taylor, Family by Family, How School Segregation Still Happens, N.Y.
TIMES (Apr. 28, 2017), http://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/28/nyregion/school
-segregation-nyc-district-3.html [http://perma.cc/YB5Y-E7NC].
45. There is strong evidence that residential segregation contributes to school segrega-
tion. See Erica Frankenberg, The Role of Residential Segregation in Contemporary
School Segregation, 45 EDUC. & URB. Soc. 548 (2013); Gary Orfield & Nancy
McArdle, The Vicious Cycle: Segregated Housing, Schools and Intergenerational Ine-
quality, HARV. U. JOINT CTR. Hous. STUD. (Aug. 2006), http://www.jchs.harvard.
edu/sites/jchs.harvard.edulfiles/w06-4_orfield.pdf [http://perma.cc6Z8T-AL3N].
However, in a troubling testament to the persistence of educational segregation,
decreasing residential segregation has not led to aggregate decreases in school seg-
regation, and certain areas that have become considerably more residentially inte-
grated have simultaneously experienced rising school segregation. See Sean F.
Reardon & John T. Yun, Integrating Neighborhoods, Segregating Schools: The Re-
treat from School Desegregation in the South, 1990-2000, 81 N.C. L. REv. 1563,




creation of smaller political units at the metropolitan level),"4 the retrenchment
of legal and political efforts aimed at desegregation,47 and changing de-
mographics.4 The effect in the aggregate has reversed many of the gains since
Brown v. Board of Education.49 There are several channels by which this re-
segregation is taking place, including white flight to private schools,50 increasing
school choice," the lifting of desegregation orders,52 and the fragmentation of
previously integrated districts.53 This multiplicity of actors and mechanisms can
black-white residential dissimilarity had declined markedly, black-white school
dissimilarity remains virtually unchanged as desegregation efforts are dissolved. In
the South, black-white school dissimilarity has increased since 1990.").
46. See Genevieve Siegel-Hawley, City Lines, County Lines, Color Lines: The Relation-
ship Between School and Housing Segregation in Four Southern Metro Areas, 115
TCHRS. C. REC. 1, 4-9 (2013); Orfield et al., E Pluribus, supra note 1, at xx.
47. See, e.g., Orfield et al., E Pluribus, supra note 1, at xviii-xx, 3-11 (noting effective
mobilization of political opposition to desegregation as well as Supreme Court de-
cisions weakening efforts to desegregate).
48. Part of the reason that more black and Latinx students attend schools with fewer
and fewer white students is that the population of the United States has become
increasingly non-white. Id. at 21-27. However, there is evidence that these chang-
ing demographics are not the whole story. For example, "[b]lack students' average
contact with whites gained until the late 1980s even though the proportion of white
students in the country was declining." Id. at 21. Furthermore, for white students,
the gap between their percentage of the population as a whole and the average per-
centage of white students in schools attended by the typical white student has in-
creased since 1991. Id. Thus, while at an absolute level more white students are ex-
periencing racial diversity at the K-12 level, proportionally to their representation
in the population as a whole they are becoming more segregated. And in the
southern United States, the increases in segregation as a result of policy changes
rather than simply demographic changes are stark. Id. at 23-25.
49. See supra note 1.
50. Reardon & Yun, supra note 45, at 1585-86 ("In 1980, 1990, and 2000, county-level
white private school enrollment rates were tightly linked to the black proportion
of the county school-age population: white private school enrollment rates are ex-
tremely high in predominantly black counties, despite decades of stable integra-
tion in the public schools. This suggests that private schools continue to serve as a
segregative mechanism in the South.").
51. See, e.g., GARY ORFIELD & ERICA FRANKENBERG, EDUCATIONAL DELUSIONS? WHY
CHOICE CAN DEEPEN INEQUALITY AND How To MAKE SCHOOLS FAIR (2013).
52. Gary Orfield et al., Brown at 60: Great Progress, a Long Retreat and an Uncertain
Future, UCLA C.R. PROJECT/PROYECTo DERS. CIVILES 9-10 (2016), http://www
.civilrightsproject.ucla.edu/research/k- 12-education/integration-and-diversity/
brown-at-60-great-progress-a-long-retreat-and-an-uncertain-future/
Brown-at-60-051814.pdf [http://perma.cc/Z57L-5567] (noting the role of lifting
desegregation orders on re-segregation in the South).
53. See infra note 116 and accompanying text.
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make curbing re-segregation quite difficult, as it often occurs in a nationwide
yet decentralized manner at the city, school, and family level.
B. Higher Education's Role in Increasing Educational Inequality
"Merit"-focused college admissions, with its emphasis on tests and high
school performance, will tend to replicate unequal K-12 outcomes.Y As a result
of this and other factors, the population of individuals who graduate from high
school but do not attend college is becoming increasingly concentrated in fami-
lies at the bottom of the income spectrum." And at a systemic level, current col-
lege admissions practices will exacerbate K-12 re-segregation. The increasing
competitiveness of college admissions pushes affluent parents to invest ever
more resources in their children's educations." This contributes to class segre-
gation at the K- 12 level, as these parents tend to seek out schools with few low-
income students." Part of the reason middle-class parents avoid integrated
54. See, e.g., STEPHEN BURD, NEW AMERICA, UNDERMINING PELL, VOLUME II: How
COLLEGES' PURSUIT OF PRESTIGE AND REVENUE Is HURTING Low-INCOME STUDENTS
(2014); Anthony P. Carnevale & Jeff Strohl, How Increasing College Access Is In-
creasing Inequality and What To Do About It, in REWARDING STRIVERS: HELPING
Low-INCOME STUDENTS SUCCEED IN COLLEGE 71 (Richard D. Kahlenberg ed.,
2010), http://tcf.org/assets/downloads/tcf-CarnevaleStrivers.pdf [http://perma.cc/
U2P5-3JQZ]; Brown-Nagin, supra note 6, at 467-72; Benjamin Wermund, How
U.S. News College Rankings Promote Economic Inequality on Campus, POLITICO
(Sept. 10, 2017), http://www.politico.com/interactives/2017/top-college-rankings
-list-2017-us-news-investigation/ [http://perma.cc/AQH7-SZMT] (noting that
Princeton and Yale, among other top colleges, "admit more students from the top
1 percent of earners than the bottom 60 percent combined").
55. Carnevale & Strohl, supra note 54, at 72 ("In 1967, 25 percent of the nation's high
school graduates who did not attain postsecondary education were concentrated
in families in the bottom two deciles of family income, and almost 69 percent were
in families in the middle five deciles in family income. By 2004, more than 37 per-
cent of high school graduates were in families in the bottom two deciles of family
income, and the amount in the middle five had dropped to 52 percent;").
56. See, e.g., Allison Roda & Amy Stuart Wells, School Choice Policies and Racial Segre-
gation: Where White Parents' Good Intentions, Anxiety, and Privilege Collide, 119
AM. J. ED. 261, 280 (2013) ("[T]he high levels of inequality in the United States
promotes anxiety as more advantaged parents worry that their children are suscep-
tible to downward mobility if they do not have the 'right' educational credentials.
This nervousness seems to have only worsened as educational policies have
stressed outcomes and competition amid a highly unequal society."); see also
DANIEL MARKOVITS, MERITOCRACY AND ITS DISCONTENTS (forthcoming) (describ-
ing the significant role of hyper-competition in education to rising inequality).
57. Roda & Wells, supra note 56; Natalie Lacireno-Paquet & Charleen Brantley, Who
Chooses Schools, and Why?, EDUC. & PUB. INT. CTR. 18 (Jan. 2008),
http://epsl.asu.edu/epru/documents/EPSL-0801-247-EPRU.pdf [http://perma.cc/




schools is because the values rewarded in the college admissions process, pri-
marily test scores but also counseling resources and prestige, will tend to valor-
ize schools that are predominantly affluent and racially white or Asian.58 Parents
in a position to choose schools will therefore often see sending their children to
a racially- or class-integrated school as necessarily entailing a "sacrifice," both in
terms of their education and of their college prospects. 9
It is true that in addition to contributing to educational inequality, colleges
also seek to promote educational equality-primarily but not exclusively
through affirmative action programs. These programs draw on what Professor
Guinier terms "contest'*"' and "sponsorship"' mobility, as opposed to the kind
of "structural" mobility that aims to shift the operation of the educational sys-
tem more broadly.'" There is a continual tension between the limited scope of
incremental solutions, such as increasing what is called "pipeline mobility" by
focusing on the admission and recruitment of individual students from disad-
vantaged backgrounds, and fundamental structural changes that seem well be-
yond what institutions are willing to contemplate or effectuate. There is a vi-
cious cycle at work here. College admissions exacerbate inequality by judging
students on metrics like standardized testing that correlate strongly with paren-
tal income."^ These admissions policies are constrained by the influence of
rankings, which reward schools for the selectiveness of their admissions, and by
concerns about tuition.6 4 And while parents and students may be more con-
scious of the stress of the college admissions process than anyone, 5 their aware-
ness of the social and economic benefits of a college education in today's econ-
58. Wells et al., supra note 15, at 29.
59. Id. (noting that when schools are evaluated "in a manner that strongly correlates
to the race and class of the students, then efforts to create more racially/ethnically
diverse schools are framed as though white and Asian families are 'giving up some-
thing"').
6o. Guinier, supra note 26, at 144.
61. Id. at 151.
62. Id. at 159-71.
63. Id.
64. See ScoTT ANDREW SCHULZ & JEROME A. LUCIDO, U.S. CAL. CTR. FOR ENROLLMENT
RES., POL., & PRAC., ENROLLMENT MANAGEMENT, INC.: EXTERNAL INFLUENCES ON
OUR PRACTICE (2011); Financial Aid: Examining the Thinking Behind the Policy,
EDUC. CONSERVANCY (June 2015), http://www.educationconservancy.org/
PresidentialThinking.pdf [http://perma.cc/BTU7-Y28T].
65. See, e.g., Frank Bruni, How to Survive the College Admissions Madness, N.Y. TIMES
(Mar. 13, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/03/15/opinion/sunday/frank-
bruni-how-to-survive-the-college-admissions-madness.html
[http://perma.cc/SA4M-3BG4]; see also infra note 99.
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omy can lead them to fixate on these rankings.6 6 This cycle will undermine re-
forms that target only one level of this process, such as programs that employ
solely a pipeline model.7
For example, recent proposals have advocated for adopting affirmative ac-
tion for first generation professionals' or low-income students, 9 weighting
standardized test scores to account for stereotype threat,7 0 using applicants' ZIP
codes to maximize geographic diversity,' or ensuring that notions of "service"
include activities like caregiving for a sibling or relative.72 Some commentators
have made policy suggestions that have a certain overlap with the proposal out-
lined in this Note: that colleges take into account the poverty density of an ap-
plicant's school,73 the racial composition of an applicant's school,74 or the level
66. See Carnevale & Strohl, supra note 54; Wermund, supra note 54. See also Lindsey
Cook, Is the College Admissions Bubble About to Burst, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP.
(Sep. 22, 2014), http://www.usnews.com/news/blogs/data-mine/2014/09/22/is-the-
college-admissions-bubble-about-to-burst [http://perma.cc/6WE6-8686].
67. On the limitations of the pipeline model in light of the prevalent segregation at the
K-12 level, see, for example, Guinier, supra note 26, at 143-58, which discusses the
shortcomings of sponsorship and conflict mobility, Redfield, supra note 26; and
James Piereson & Naomi Schaefer Riley, Getting More Poor Kids Into College Won't
Fix Income Inequality, WASH. PosT (Oct. 23, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.
com/opinions/getting-more-poor-kids-into-colege-wont-fix-income-inequality/
2014/10/23/494e49 1a-4fc5- 11e4-babe-e9 1da079cb8a-story.html [http://perma.cc/
8SSC-H6A2].
68. See Brown-Nagin, supra note 6, at 435-36.
69. See Richard D. Kahlenberg, A Better Affirmative Action: State Universities that Cre-
ated Alternatives to Racial Preferences, CENTURY FOUND. 26-52 (2012),
http://tcf.orglassets/downloads/tcf-abaa.pdf [http://perma.cc/ST44-DVSX].
70. See Sam Erman & Gregory M. Walton, Stereotype Threat and Antidiscrimination
Law: Affirmative Steps to Promote Meritocracy and Racial Equality in Education, 88
S. CAL. L. REv. 307, 340 (2015); Gregory M. Walton, Steven J. Spencer & Sam Er-
man, Affirmative Meritocracy, 7 Soc. ISSUES & POL'Y REV. 1, 2-3 (2013).
71. Danielle Allen, Talent Is Everywhere: Using ZIP Codes and Merit to Enhance Diver-
sity, in BEYOND AFFIRMATIVE ACTION 145, 145-59 (R. Kahlenberg ed. 2014).
72. See, e.g., MAKING CARING COMMON, Turning the Tide: Inspiring Concern for Others
and the Common Good Through College Admissions, HARV. GRAD. SCHL. EDUC. 16
(Jan. 20, 2016), http://mcc.gse.harvard.edu/files/gse-mcc/files/20160120_mccttt
_report-interactive.pdf [http://perma.cc/KRD7-QFCG].
73. Gerald Fornwald, Economic Considerations: An Affirmative Action Proposal, 2 U.
ST. THOMAS L.J. 199, 202 (2004) (stating that, among other economic variables,
"the poverty density of an applicant's high school must be examined," and sug-
gesting that the precursor program to FRPL be used as a measure).
74. Daria Roithmayr, Direct Measures: An Alternative Form of Affirmative Action, 7




of funding of the applicant's school;" or that they should undo the currently
existing preferences for elite prep school students with the same SAT scores as
public school students.76 Such plans take into account the profound role of K-
12 inequality in denying equal educational opportunity to historically un-
derrepresented groups. Some colleges have heeded this call and are already tak-
ing certain economic features of an applicant's school into account.7 However,
these proposals see school profile as part of a laundry list of other items.' As
such, school composition becomes "but a factor of a factor of a factor in the ho-
listic-review calculus," to borrow Justice Kennedy's description.79 Much of this
work has also remained within the framework of "pipeline" or "sponsorship"
diversity,so in which colleges promote diversity and equality in higher education
by admitting individual students from underrepresented backgrounds.
While such approaches may indeed be constructive, they are also necessari-
ly limited by institutional considerations." Because of their reliance on the
pipeline approach, these approaches will be constrained by such factors as ad-
ministrators' inevitable awareness of commercial college rankings that reflect
the test scores of incoming classes (which tend to correlate with parental in-
come), of available financial aid, and of future alumni donor bases, to name just
75. Id. ("Has the applicant attended primary or secondary educational institutions, or
institutions of higher learning, whose enrolled students are predominantly stu-
dents of one race, and whose funding levels, teacher assignments, facilities, extra-
curricular activities and transportation resources are consistently below the na-
tional or regional average?").
76. Richard D. Kahlenberg, Class-Based Affirmative Action, 84 CAL. L. REv. 1037, 1090
(1996).
77. Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin (Fisher II), 136 S. Ct. 2198, 2206 (2016). Certain
county school districts have also sought to produce integrated schools without re-
lying on race, generally by using neighborhood as a proxy. See, e.g., Stephen M.
Rich, Inferred Classifications, 99 VA. L. REv. 1525, 1598-1603 (2013).
78. For example, in the holistic portion of its application program, the University of
Texas takes into account the "socioeconomic status of the applicant's school"
alongside "leadership experience, extracurricular activities, awards/honors, com-
munity service ... socioeconomic status of the applicant's family ... the appli-
cant's family responsibilities, whether the applicant lives in a single-parent home,
the applicant's SAT score in relation to the average SAT score at the applicant's
school, the language spoken at the applicant's home, and, finally, the applicant's
race." Fisher H1, 136 S. Ct. at 2206.
79. Id. at 2207 (referring to race, another item on the list, as "but a 'factor of a factor
of a factor' in the holistic-review calculus" (quoting Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Aus-
tin, 645 F. Supp. 2d 587, 608 (W.D. Tex. 2009))).
80. Guinier, supra note 26, at 143-58.
81. See Richard P~rez-Pefia, Efforts to Recruit Poor Students Lag at Some Elite Colleges,
N.Y. TIMEs (July 30, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/31/education/elite
-colleges-differ-on-how-they-aid-poor.html [http://perma.cc/2U5N-ZF5X].
233
YALE LAW & POLICY REVIEW
a few."2 These limitations help explain why, despite colleges' commitment to af-
firmative action programs, socioeconomic diversity at selective schools remains
quite low.83 These constraints do not impose an absolute limit, and progress can
certainly be made within them,4 but they are unlikely to disappear any time
soon. The policy proposal in this paper represents a potential new avenue for
combating the lack of socioeconomic diversity at colleges and undoing segrega-
tion in the educational system as a whole, and doing so within existing institu-
tional constraints." This plan thus operationalizes Guinier's notion of structur-
al mobility, under which "an institution ... might measure its success, for
-example, not only by the students it admits but also by the changes it precipi-
tates in educational opportunity at the K-12 level."86 In taking a structural ap-
proach, this plan is similar to Danielle Allen's suggestions17 or to a proposed na-
tionwide Ten Percent plan," although for reasons that I will discuss below, it is
82. See SCHULZ & LUCIDO, supra note 64, at 4-5, 8-10, 19.
83. See, e.g., Danette Gerald & Kati Haycock, Engines of Inequality: Diminishing Equity
in the Nation's Premier Public Universities, ED. TRUST 4-7 (2006), http://edtrust
.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/ 1/Enginesoflnequality.pdf [http://perma.cc/
PXC2-Y3E9]; Carnevale & Strohl, supra note 54, at 73; Wermund, supra note 54.
See also BURD, supra note 54 (describing how college financial aid practices harm
and deter low-income students).
84. See Nicholas Hillman, Economic Diversity Among Selective Colleges: Measuring the
Enrollment Impact of "No-Loan" Programs, INST. FOR HIGHER EDUC. POL'Y 10-11
(2012), http://www.ihep.org/sites/default/files/uploads/docs/pubs/brief-economic
_diversity-among-selectivecolleges-august_2012.pdf [http://perma.cc/VR6L-9H
AH] (noting the correlation between test scores and income and that "greater se-
lectivity is associated with less economic diversity"). Though there is considerable
debate over how many more students from low-income backgrounds selective col-
leges could admit without changing their quantitative admissions standards, even
the higher estimates remain limited. On the higher end, some researchers have es-
timated that selective colleges could increase the percentage of students from the
bottom family income quartile from 11 percent -to 17 percent. See WILLIAM G.
BOWEN, MARTIN A. KURZWEIL & EUGENE M. TOBIN, EQUITY AND EXCELLENCE IN
AMERICAN HIGHER EDUCATION, 255 (2005). Others offer a more modest appraisal,
with a potential increase from 10 percent to 13 percent of students from the bot-
tom two family income quintiles at the most selective colleges without changes in
standards. See Gordon C. Winston & Catharine B. Hill, Access to the Most Selective
Private Colleges by High-Ability, Low-Income Students: Are They Out There?, in
ASPEN SYMPosIUM 2005: EXPLORING THE FUTURE OF HIGHER EDUCATION 19.1-19.36
(Maureen E. Devlin ed., 2005), http://www.educause.edu/ir/1ibrary/pdf/ffp06W
.pdf [http://perma.cc/U8T6-SD3F].
85. See infra text accompanying notes 153-155.
86. Guinier, supra note 26, at 160-61.
87. See Allen, supra note 71.




likely to be significantly more effective at reversing K- 12 segregation nationwide
than either of those two options.8 9
C. How This Policy Could Help Combat Re-segregation
1. Because College Admissions Express Norms, It Can Coordinate the
Behavior of Otherwise Decentralized Actors
There are several reasons why college admissions would represent a par-
ticularly effective point of intervention in reducing educational inequality at the
K-12 level nationwide. As noted above, part of what can make segregation so
difficult to counteract is that it often takes place in a decentralized manner. Col-
lege admissions would provide a way to coordinate these disparate actors spread
across the country. Harnessing the norm-enunciating dynamic of admissions
provides an inexpensive means to have a force-multiplying effect. The structur-
al approach taken here seeks to harness the fact that college admissions serve a
powerful role in articulating and expressing norms of educational value, which
in turn trickle down and influence the decision-making processes of millions of
parents and children.
An example of how this mechanism could work is the Harvard School of
Education and the Education Conservancy's joint project, Turning the Tide.9 o
Dozens of adriiinistrators an admissions officials endorsed the report, which
advocates shifting admissions criteria to focus on community values. One ex-
ample is prioritizing applicants who demonstrate a long-term commitment to
community service.91 The changes in admissions policy recommended in Turn-
ing the Tide are in themselves laudable, and will presumably result in some
shifts in the composition of the student body admitted by the colleges that
signed on.92 But this was not the sole aim of the plan. Instead, the plan aimed to
change pedagogical and educational values among an audience of parents and
students across the country to emphasize values of collective responsibility and
to reflect contemporary social science research on childhood development. 93
The college admissions process, the report notes, "is powerfully positioned to
send different messages that help young people become more generous and
89. See infra Section III.B.
go. See MAKING CARING COMMON, supra note 72, at 3-6.
91. Id.
92. This would be the "pipeline" or "sponsored" mobility impact of the program.
93. See MAKING CARING COMMON, supra note 72, at 1, 8-9 (describing how the college
admissions process "can motivate high school students to contribute to others and
their communities in more authentic and meaningful ways that promote in them
genuine investment in the collective good and deeper understanding of and re-
spect for others, especially those different from them in background and charac-
ter").
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humane in ways that benefit not only society but students themselves." 94 By
harnessing the norm-enunciating function of admissions as a force multiplier,
the report aimed to influence the behavior and beliefs of a nationwide audience.
While this approach is promising, the specific changes advocated in the report
do little to address systematic racial and socioeconomic inequality head on.
What is novel about the proposal advocated in the present paper is that it seeks
to activate the admissions dynamic to address systemic inequality directly.
The main insight is not that the socioeconomic profile of an applicant's
school is an important measure of the obstacles they have faced-though there
is no question that it is. The crux is instead that coordination among a number
of institutions to use this specific criterion in a highly visible manner has the po-
tential to shift educational practices nationwide. This more structural approach
is similar in certain ways to the Texas Ten Percent Plan, in that both seek to de-
sign college admissions to shift incentives at the K-12 level to undermine or
blunt the force of existing K-12 segregation, in part by dramatically reducing
the benefits of sending children to the most affluent and selective K-12
schools.95
By their very nature, admissions processes express values and define in-
groups. Perhaps nowhere is this truer at the society-wide level than in college
admissions. The bundle of traits that colleges look for, beyond simple grades
and scores-athletic prowess, prizes, musical ability, adversity overcome, and so
on-express a conception of what these institutions understand to be constitu-
tive of an applicant's value. One need only look at the myriad factors institu-
tions claim to take into account, as well as how they describe the process, to
reach this conclusion.9' Of course, this list of traits is often shaped by institu-
tional objectives as well: for example, recruiting a class that will not break the
bank in student aid and that will become an alumni donor base that can be
called upon to financially support the school down the road.97 And the deci-
sions colleges make about what to value in admissions do not take place in a
94. Id. at 1.
95. Guinier, supra note 26, at 162-171 (noting, among other things, that prior to the
Ten Percent Plan, "ten percent of the state's high schools-particularly those in
the affluent, predominantly white areas of suburban or metropolitan Houston,
Austin, and Dallas-had been providing fifty percent to seventy-five percent of the
freshman class at UT Austin").
96. See, e.g., What We Look For, HARv. C., http://college.harvard.edu/admissions/
application-process/what-we-look [http://perma.cc/5HVA-GR26] (providing de-
tailed lists of questions under categories such as "growth and potential," "interests
and activities," "character and personality," and "contribution to the Harvard
community").
97. See, e.g., BURD, supra note 54; SCHULZ & LUCIDO, supra note 64, at 2 ("It is appar-
ent many enrollment practices have become more market-driven, oftentimes aim-
ing to secure students who not only fill seats but fulfill myriad institutional goals,




vacuum. Colleges are rewarded for optimizing the classes they recruit in ways
that will be recognized by the college ranking metrics.98 These metrics would be
irrelevant, of course, if parents and applicants did not take them seriously.
There is thus a self-reinforcing cycle of communication at work here: colleges
express an idea of what makes an applicant valuable; ranking organizations val-
ue the colleges based in part on their ability to successfully recruit applicants
deemed valuable based on criteria gleaned from widespread admissions practic-
es; and parents and applicants seek out the schools seen as best on these rank-
ings, both for educational purposes and because a student's acceptance at a
highly ranked institution will transmit the message that the student has the
traits that are considered valuable. It is unsurprising, therefore, that parents and
applicants adjust their behavior and make important decisions with an eye to
optimizing chances at college acceptance.99
As is characteristic of systems with a core expressive component, the mes-
sage being broadcast is highly legible, public-facing, and presents itself and is
understood as coming from a place of expertise.'0 0 It is legible across the actors
most directly involved-colleges, rankings organization, and parents and appli-
cants-as well as wider society-future employers, professional schools, and
peers. There is no question that admissions are public and public-facing. And
even beyond the modern development of enrollment consultants, it is hard to
imagine a more quintessential site of recognized expertise than higher educa-
tion.
There are two qualifications to emphasize at this juncture. First, there is no
question that all three of these groups of actors are, at times, acting strategically
or even cynically to optimize their results. While this may be true, it does not
98. BURD, supra note 54; see also Wendy Nelson Espeland & Michael Sander, Rankings
and Reactivity: How Public Measures Recreate Social Worlds, 113 AM. J. Soc. 1, 12-
13, 25-27 (2007) (describing a similar dynamic for law schools).
99. Suniya S. Luthar & Bronwyn E. Becker; Privileged but Pressured? A Study of Afflu-
ent Youth, 73 CHILD DEV. 1593, 1594, 1600-05 (2002) (describing the maladaptive
effects of achievement pressures, in which children responding to the "ubiquitous
emphasis on ensuring that children ensure admission to stellar colleges" can
"come to believe that their parents value them more for what they do than for who
they are"); Noelle R. Leonard et al., A Multi-Method Exploratory Study of Stress,
Coping, and Substance Use Among High School Youth in Private Schools, 6
FRONTIERS. PSYCHOL. 9-11, 13 (July 23, 2015), http://www
.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4511824/pdf/fpsyg-06-01028.pdf [http://
perma.cc/T4M3-FVU9] (describing the internalization of academic expectations
focused on college admission, and stating "parental expectations, coupled with the
demanding academic curricula offered by the private schools, appear to convey to
students that the main purpose of their high school experience is admission to a
selective college or university"); see also Espeland & Sander, supra note 98.
ioo. RICHARD M. MCADAMS, THE EXPRESSIVE POWERS OF LAW: THEORIES AND LIMITS
179-81 (2015) (identifying legibility, public-facingness, and assertions of expertise
as three basic features of the expressive power of law).
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substantially undermine the idea that college admissions is a site of value ex-
pression. Social science research has indeed found that affluent parents and ap-
plicants are internalizing the values expressed-often with negative conse-
quences.o' Furthermore, work on the concept of performativity can help us
understand how, even outside of the question of individual intention, the repet-
itive performance of norms can be constitutive of identity (and constraining
upon it)."o2 And indeed, even when certain ends are pursued strategically or
cynically, to the extent that the individuals involved feel that they are playing by
the rules, they will develop expectations that will inform their sense of what is
fair or unfair in admissions."3 Second, a longstanding critique argues that the
college admissions process actually has little to do with educational merit or
value, but is simply a process of credentialing. On this view, behind the faqade
of education lies a process by which well-to-do families reproduce and entrench
cultural capital. 0 4 For the purposes of this paper, however, there is no need to
take a position on the degree to which the system of higher education is about
credentialing rather than education. It is possible to profoundly critique the ex-
isting system from either position. Both authors who doubt that there is much
of a "there there" in admissions and those who argue that admissions draw on
criteria that provide a relatively accurate proxy for certain forms of future eco-
nomic productivity can nonetheless find that our current focus on these criteria
is a deeply value-laden decision.' On either account, value choices are made,
expressed loudly, and heard broadly.o6
The expressive nature of college admissions is at the core of this policy pro-
posal. In effect, this program would seek to harness the influence and power of
college admissions. By sending a message that promotes school integration and
valorizes the pedagogical benefits of diversity at both K-12 and college levels,
institutions of higher education could use their substantial influence to reduce
educational inequality and produce greater inclusiveness.
io. See supra note 99.
102. Cf JUDITH BUTLER, BODIES THAT MATTER: ON THE DISCURSIvE LIMITS OF "SEX" 2-3,
15-16, 94-95 (1993).
103. Guinier, supra note 26, at 150 ("Contest mobility reinforces the culture of merito-
cratic entitlement among its primary beneficiaries, upper-middle-class whites,
who feel they have played by the rules and therefore deserve to win.").
104. See, e.g., Pierre Bourdieu, Cultural Reproduction and Social Reproduction (1973),
351-68 in MODERNITY: CULTURAL MODERNITY (Malcolm Waters, ed., 1999).
105. Compare MARKOVITS, supra note 56, with Susan Sturm & Lani Guinier, The Future






2. Adopting this Plan Would Help Far More Students Than Just
Those Who Were Admitted to Colleges as a Result
The adoption of these admissions standards would have a far wider effect
than its influence on the students admitted to colleges through the program.
This is because the incentive offered by this program will be felt most strongly
by more affluent parents, a group that has played an important role in the re-
segregation of American educationo 7 which has undone much of the progress
of the past sixty years."o' These parents have an outsized influence on the quality
of schools, since they have the greatest ability to exercise "voice" through direct
parental engagement, to show "loyalty" through parent organizations that fun-
nel donations to schools,'" and to deploy "exit" by shopping for school districts
(the fact that much public school funding is tied to property taxes gives wealthi-
er families increased importance)" or lobbying for vouchers to enable them to
place their children in private schools.1 " Their receptivity to this new incentive
107. On how parents seek to avoid schools with significant numbers of low-income
students, see Lacireno and Brantley, supra note 57, at 12, 14, 18; Roda & Wells, su-
pra note 56, at 277. On the role of affluent communities in splitting apart integrat-
ed school districts, see, for example, Erika K. Wilson, The New School Segregation,
102 CORNELL L. REv. 139 (2016), and EDBUILD, supra note 15.
io8. See Section I.A.
1o. See, e.g., Dana Goldstein, PTA Gift for Someone Else's Child? A Touchy Subject in
California, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 8, 2017), http://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/08/us/
california-pta-fund-raising-inequality.html [http://perma.cc/JAL8-ZHZG]; Laura
McKenna, How Rich Parents Can Exacerbate School Inequality, ATLANTIC (Jan. 28,
2016), http://www.theatlantic.com/education/archive/2016/0 1/rich-parents-school
-inequality/431640 [http://perma.cc/E776-TFTK]; Rob Reich, Not Very Giving,
N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 4, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/05/opinion/
not-very-giving.html [http://perma.cc/FSW6-NCRE]; Jeremy Adam Smith, How
Budget Cuts and PTA Fundraising Undermined Equity in San Francisco Public
Schools, S.F. PuB. PRESS (Feb. 3, 2014), http://sfpublicpress.org/news/2014-02/how-
budget-cuts-and-PTA-fundraising-undermined-equity-in-san-francisco-public-
schools [http://perma.cc/R8XG-H8VR]; Catherine Brown, Scott Sargrad & Meg
Benner, Hidden Money: The Outsized Role of Parent Contributions in School Fi-
nance, CTR. AM. PROGRESS 1 (Apr. 2017), http://cdn.americanprogress.org/
content/uploads/2017/04/18074902/ParentFundraising-report-corrected.pdf
[http://perma.cc/BUB6-UF4L] (noting that "[wihile the millions of dollars parents
raise is equivalent to less than 1 percent of total school spending, the concentra-
tion of these dollars in affluent schools results in considerable advantages for a
small portion of already advantaged students").
no. See, e.g., Holme, supra note 43; Siegel-Hawley, supra note 46.
Il. The exit/voice/loyalty framework was pioneered in ALBERT O. HIRSCHMAN, EXIT,
VOICE, AND LOYALTY: RESPONSES TO DECLINE IN FIRMS, ORGANIZATIONS, AND
STATES (1970). For the ability of affluent parents to select and influence schools,
see, for example, Harry Brighouse, Educational Justice and Socio-economic Segrega-
tion in Schools, 41 J. PHIL. ED. 575, 581 (2007), which notes how parents with re-
239
YALE LAW & POLICY REVIEW
would come from the same desire currently motivating affluent parents to send
their children to segregated schools: securing the educational and status benefits
of having their children admitted to selective colleges.
As noted above, such parents may be concerned that sending their children
to schools with a significant population of low-income students will harm them
academically or hurt their college prospects. The former apprehension is largely
empirically incorrect; studies show that middle-class students do not fare worse
academically when placed in economically and racially integrated schools."' The
sources and high levels of education "raise funds through parent associations and
private donations" and "are also more likely to vote, organise, and lobby for more
public spending." See also Jonathan Rothwell, Housing Costs, Zoning, and Access to
High-Scoring Schools, BROOKINGS INST. 14 (April 2012), http://www.brookings.
edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/0419schoolinequalityrothwell.pdf
[http://perma.cc/96EL-FAYS] ("Across the 100 largest metropolitan areas, housing
costs an average of 2.4 times as much, or nearly $11,000 more per year, near a
high-scoring public school than near a low-scoring public school."); Aaron Tra-
ister, American Schools Are Still Segregated, FusioN (Dec. 29, 2015),
http://fusion.net/story/248866/public-school-segregation-inequality/
[http://perma.cc/65U4-93QG].
112. See Aprile D. Benner & Robert Crosnoe, The Racial/Ethnic Composition of Elemen-
tary Schools and Young Children's Academic and Socioemotional Functioning, 48
AM. ED. RES. J. 621, 638 (2011) (finding that the academic achievement of white
students increased in racially diverse schools, as well as noting various benefits in
socioemotional functioning); Shelly Brown-Jeffy, The Race Gap in High School
Reading Achievement: Why School Racial Composition Still Matters, 13 RACE,
GENDER & CLASS 268, 290 (2006); Kahlenberg, supra note 15, at 1554 (describing
how in the case of socioeconomic integration in one county, "there is no evidence
that [middle class students] are being harmed academically by economic mixing");
Halley Potter & Kimberly Quick, The Secret to School Integration, N. Y. TIMES (Feb.
23, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/23/opinion/the-secret-to-school-
integration.html [http://perma.cc/HL94-FUPG] (listing various instances of more
integrated school districts being dismantled and stating that "[1]ow-income stu-
dents' achievement improves in integrated schools, and contrary to many parental
concerns, middle-class students' achievement does not suffer"); Roslyn Arlin
Mickelson, School Integration and K-12 Outcomes: An Updated Quick Synthesis of
the Social Science Evidence, NAT'L COAL. ON SCHL. DIVERSITY 2 (2016),
http://www.school-diversity.org/pdf/DiversityResearchBriefNo5.pdf [http://perma
.cc/XJU6-LJQZ] ("Students from all racial and SES backgrounds benefit from di-
verse schools. Middle class white youths experience benefits from diversity as well,
although low-income and disadvantaged minority youth gain the most."); Wells,
supra note 15 at 12 ("Attending racially diverse schools is beneficial to all students
and is associated with smaller test score gaps between students of different racial
backgrounds, not because white student achievement declined, but rather that
black and/or Hispanic student achievement increased."); see also Rucker C. John-
son, Long-Run Impacts of School Desegregation & School Quality of Adult Attain-
ments (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 16664, 2015)
http://www.nber.org/papers/wl6664.pdf [http://perma.cc/983J-8FNL] (reporting




latter, however, may be partly true, in that integrated schools may not always
offer the prestigious name or the networking opportunities of affluent schools,
or even the resources of middle-class schools.'13 An admissions bonus could
help counterbalance this. The program advocated in this Note would allow
middle-class parents to learn firsthand that their children will benefit, not suf-
fer, academically from attending an integrated school, and could substantially
reduce the other college admissions advantages of attending a school whose at-
tendees are uniformly from more affluent class families. Other concerns that
more affluent parents might have, such as the social environment of schools
with a substantial number of low-income students, are also belied by research
showing that students who attended integrated schools report, among other
benefits, improved intergroup understanding, tolerance, and ability to make
friends. 14
There are three principal avenues through which this incentive could curb
re-segregation: encouraging affluent public and private schools towards greater
socioeconomic integration, strengthening integrated public schools currently at
risk of being broken up, and attracting affluent students to public and private
schools currently enrolling a majority of non-affluent students.
Private and public schools currently enrolling primarily students whose
backgrounds are middle-class and above would have an incentive to include
more students from low-income backgrounds. Private schools would have an
incentive to recruit more students from low-income families, and the local gov-
ernments determining the district boundaries of public schools would have an
interest in creating districts that included sizeable low-income populations
alongside higher-income populations, the exact opposite of the current situa-
tion. The benefits of this would lie in the increased intergroup contact of both
affluent and low-income students who would otherwise have been educated
nificantly increased both educational and occupational attainments, college quali-
ty and adult earnings, reduced the probability of incarceration, and improved
adult health status" while "desegregation had no effects on whites across each of
these outcomes.").
113. See Orfield, E Pluribus, supra note 1, at 7-8; see also Sandra Black, Laura Giuliano
& Ayushi Narayan, Civil Rights Data Show More Work is Needed to Reduce Inequi-
ties in K-12 Schools, OBAMA WHITE HOUSE ARCHIVES (Dec. 9, 2016),
http://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/blog/2016/12/08/civil-rights-data-show
-more-work-needed-reduce-inequities-k- 12-schools [http://perma.cc/ZB3Y-BSD
W] (From 2013-14, minority students were 20 to 40 percent more likely than
white students to be "one of the 1.6 million students who attend a school where
there is a school law enforcement officer but no guidance counselor."); Key Data
Highlights on Equity And Opportunity Gaps in Our Nation's Public Schools, U.S.
DEP'T EDUC. OFF. FOR C.R. (2016), http://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/
ocr/docs/2013-14-first-look.pdf [http://perma.cc/EVJ9-Y66E].
114. See, e.g., Orfield, E Pluribus, supra note 1, at 9; see also infra Section II.b for a more
detailed discussion of the social benefits of receiving an education in a more di-
verse environment.
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separately,"' as well as the wider benefit of increasing the number of low-
income students who would gain access to the educational resources of more
affluent schools.
A second place where the incentive of this program could play a role would
be in protecting currently integrated school districts from being broken up.
Certain districts that have been integrated are now being fractured through a
process known as "secession.""' In this process, predominantly affluent, white
communities seek to break apart racially and economically integrated school
districts to form smaller, breakaway schools districts that are more economical-
ly and racially homogenous. A recent report identified 71 such attempted seces-
sions since 2000.117 The segregating results of these secessions can be striking.
For example, in 2014, six school districts, predominantly white and affluent,
broke off from the larger Shelby County School District, which includes Mem-
phis, Tennessee."' While initial attempts to secede had been blocked by a feder-
al judge, successful lobbying of the state legislature resulted in a law making it
far easier for these areas to secede.' 9 The breakaway school districts "have an
average student poverty rate of 11%, lower than that of Beverly Hills.""zo In con-
trast "one-third of the students in the shrunken Shelby County district live be-
low the poverty line-a rate higher even than that of Compton, California.""
The results for the Shelby County schools of losing the more affluent students
(and the corresponding tax base) were disastrous: budget cuts of 20 percent, the
closure of seven Memphis-area schools in 2014-15, and the laying off of almost
500 teachers in 2015 and 2016.1" Indeed, the fact that districts are often tied to
tax revenue 2 3 is another reason why it is particularly important to prevent inte-
grated districts from being broken apart, and to incentivize the creation of inte-
grated districts.
The predominantly white and affluent communities that undertake these
secessions are motivated by a number of factors, both financial and academic,
which include a desire to improve their children's chances of being accepted to
a good college.'4 By offering a benefit to such parents for continuing to send
115. See infra notes 165-190 and accompanying text.
n6. Wilson, supra note 107, at 164-75; EDBUILD, supra note 15, at 3-8.
117. EDBUILD, supra note 15, at 3-8.
n8. Id. at 9-10.
19. Id.
120. Id. at 9.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 10.
123. See, e.g., Holme, supra note 43, at 6.
124. Potter & Quick, supra note 112; Kyle Spencer, The Uncomfortable Reality of Com-





their children to integrated schools, this program could help slow the pace of
this form of re-segregation.
Third, this policy would provide an incentive to parents with the ability to
pick schools to send their children to schools with more low-income students.
It is not always easy to discern with precision what mix of factors parents actu-
ally use to choose schools. Outside of instances of direct school choice, it may
be difficult to pinpoint which decisions (such as neighborhood choice) were
made for what reasons. And even when there are specific choice points between
schools, there can be a distance between parents' stated preferences and the
preferences revealed by their actual choices."' For example, while some white
affluent parents claim that they value sending their children to a racially diverse
school, their actions often seem to point in the opposite direction."' Nonethe-
less, it is clear that eligibility for future college admissions has a heavy influence
on both affluent parents and students in secondary education.2 7
There is also evidence that parents with the resources to choose are respon-
sive to incentives to send their children to integrated schools-as long as they
think there is something in it for their kids. For example, in response to a 1996
Connecticut Supreme Court decision mandating desegregation,"' Hartford cre-
ated a system of magnet schools under which at least 47.5% of students must be
enrolled in schools that have under 75% minority enrollment.' 9 These magnet
schools, which boast impressive facilities, have been relatively successful at both
creating desegregated schools by attracting white and Asian students (from
2007 to 2013, the percentage of Hartford students attending racially integrated
schools rose from 11% to 42%), and at producing far more equal educational
outcomes (the magnet schools "show very high levels of achievement and virtu-
ally no achievement gap by race" between Latinx and white students in several
[http://perma.cclNE5P-FX7N] ("'A lot of what is motivating these middle-class
families is economic stress,' says Amy Stuart Wells, a professor of sociology and
education at Columbia University's Teachers College.").
125. Roda & Wells, supra note 56, at 277-84 ("Therefore, as this and many other par-
ents said, they would prefer a more 'diverse' school (e.g., not all white or all
black/Latino students), but when it came time to choose, they chose
schools/programs that were disproportionately white and higher income.");
Lacireno-Paquet & Charleen Brantley, supra note 57, at 18.
126. Roda & Wells, supra note 56, at 277-84.
127. See supra note 102.
128. Sheffv. O'Neill, 678 A.2d 1267 (Conn. 1996).
129. See Kimberly Quick, Hartford Public Schools: Striving for Equity through Interdis-
trict Programs, CENTURY FOuND. 38-39 (Oct. 14, 2016),
http://tcf.org/content/report/hartford-public-schools/ [http://perma.cc/9J7T-
4P95]; Gary Orfield & Jongyeon Ee, Connecticut School Integration: Moving For-
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subjects and grade levels).13o While the Hartford plan targeted racial segrega-
tion, it has also had the effect of creating schools that are more integrated by in-
come and that produce significantly better results for low-income students.131
And lastly, studies of students in these integrated schools found significant im-
provements in intergroup attitudes.1 32
While the Hartford system still faces challenges,1 33 the success of its volun-
tary desegregation plan at inducing more affluent white and Asian families to
send their children to these magnet schools provides encouraging evidence that
substantial numbers of such families are indeed willing to choose racially and
socioeconomically integrated schools for their children-given the right incen-
tives.
There is also evidence that when it might improve their children's chances
of college admission, more affluent parents are sometimes willing to send their
kids to integrated schools with aggregate student academic performance levels
lower than more affluent non-integrated schools. For example, studies of the
Texas Ten Percent Plan have found that some more affluent parents have been
willing to send their children to lower-performing school districts in exchange
for improving their chances at college admission.'34 Looking to other school sys-
tems also indicates that there are indeed middle-class-and-up parents who value
educational diversity and are willing to place their children in economically and
130. Orfield & Ee, supra note 129, at 16.
131. Orfield & Ee, supra note 129, at 7, 16.
132. Genevieve Siegel-Hawley & Erica Frankenberg, Magnet School Student Outcomes:
What the Research Says, NAT'L COAL. ON SCHL. DIVERSIrY 2-3 (Oct. 2011),
http://school-diversity.org/pdf/DiversityResearchBriefNo6.pdf [http://perma.cc/
9KKY-79VR] (finding that "[m]inority students in magnet city schools reported
feeling significantly closer to whites and were more likely to have multiple white
friends than minorities in non-magnet city schools" and "[w]hite magnet students
felt more connected to minority students and were more likely to report multiple
minority friends than white students from the non-magnet suburban schools").
133. Even some strong supporters of the Hartford plan recognize that it is not a total
solution. Orfield & Ee, supra note 129, at 6. And certain features of Hartford's
plan, particularly the fact that it has led to the integration of these magnet schools
but not of neighborhood schools, are indeed shortcomings. See Vanessa de la Tor-
re, Left Behind: 20 Years After Sheff v. O'Neill, Students Struggle in Hartford's Segre-
gated Neighborhood Schools, HARTFORD COURANT (Mar. 12, 2017), http://
www.courant.com/education/hc-sheff-left-behind-day- 1-20170319-story.html
[http://perma.cc/4DUF-J5VG].
134. See Julie B. Cullen, Mark C. Long & Randall Reback, Jockeying for Position: Strate-
gic High School Choice Under Texas' Top-Ten Percent Plan, 97 J. PUB. ECON. 32, 44
(2013) (finding "meaningful evidence" that "[s]tudents with varied chances of
placing in the top ten percent at nearby high schools tend to 'downgrade' in peer
quality by attending high schools with lower initial top ten percent thresholds");
see also Kalena E. Cortes & Andrew I. Friedson, Ranking Up By Moving Out: The




racially integrated schools, despite the fact that such schools may have relatively
fewer resources.135
Promoting integration through the use of an incentive not only provides a
means to coordinate otherwise decentralized actors, but may also help improve
buy-in from more affluent parents. An architect of Hartford's integrated mag-
net schools, John Brittain, recognized that successful integration would require
that white families "want to integrate."1'3 Indeed, without such buy-in from
these parents, initiatives like school lotteries that are designed to increase equal-
ity can be undermined as prosperous parents use their resources to find ways to
game the system. 37 Shifting incentives so that such parents are more likely to
view the presence of low-income students as a benefit, rather than something to
be avoided, would help counteract this problem. This is particularly important
given the evidence that parents are quite conscious of school demographics,
both in terms of race and socioeconomic status, when choosing schools for
their children.13' Furthermore, this program could act upon affluent parents'
sensitivity to social status in school selection'39 by offering to help their child
gain admission to a selective college. There is also evidence from some case
studies to indicate that integration plans that incorporate a degree of choice can
be effective at winning over support over time, even among communities whose
more affluent members had previously massively opposed compelled integra-
tion.14o
135. See Roda & Wells, supra note 56, at 283 (describing such parents in New York
City); Paul Tractenberg, Allison Roda & Ryan Coughlan, Remedying School Segre-
gation: How New Jersey's Morris School District Chose to Make Diversity Work,
CENTURY FOUND. 24-26 (Dec. 12, 2016), http://s3-us-west-2.amazonaws.com/
production.tcf.org/app/uploads/2016/12/12191925/Remedying-School
-Segregation.pdf [http://perma.cc/ST5W-SEGE] (describing such parents in New
Jersey).
136. This American Life, The Problem We All Live With - Part Two, CHI. PUB. RADIO
(Aug. 7, 2015), http://www.thisamericanlife.org/radio-archives/episode/563/the-
problem-we-all-live-with-part-two [http://perma.cc/V8VH-UTBK].
137. Roda & Wells, supra note 56, at 282; Smith, supra note 109 ("The district's lottery'
system is supposed to keep schools racially and economically diverse by giving
preference to students from disadvantaged backgrounds and neighborhoods when
assigning spots. But data suggest it has largely failed at that task, perhaps since af-
fluent parents have had the time and skills to game the system, and tend to cluster
in certain schools.").
138. Lacireno-Paquet & Brantley, supra note 57, at 11-14 (indicating that in some
school choice situations, parents appear to place a higher value on demographics
than academics and that "[d]emographic information about schools appears to be
a key factor parents consider in a variety of choice settings, even when other in-
formation directly related to academics is available.").
139. Holme, supra note 43.
140. See Gary Orfield & Erica Frankenberg, Experiencing Integration in Louisville: How
Parents and Students See the Gains and Challenges, UCLA C.R. PROJECT/PROYECTO
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The creation of the incentives outlined in this Note would also help rein-
force existing integration efforts. A growing number of school districts and
charter schools across the country are currently working to promote integration
in their student bodies through the use of markers of socioeconomic status.141
This "new wave" of integration is under way in places as different as New York
City'" and Eden Prairie, Minnesota.' 43 As of 2016, such efforts reached districts
accounting for some four million students.'" This proposal would serve to mul-
tiply these efforts, providing advocates for integration with another argument
and parents who are on the fence with another nudge.
The incentives of this program could thus meaningfully shift behavior in
favor of integration. In addition to the scenarios above, this program could
provide a boost to any efforts underway at the local, state, or federal level to
promote integration, and will help push back against efforts at any of those lev-
els to re-segregate. There are several paths to affluent parents sending their chil-
dren to SES-integrated schools, without making many of the sacrifices that they
imagine would ensue. It may take a long time (if ever), however, to win this bat-
tle against "commonsense" notions at the level of ideas alone. Parents who
DERS. CIVILES 10, 22-24, 28-29 (Jan. 2011), http://civilrightsproject.ucla.edu/
research/k-12-education/integration-and-diversity/experiencing-integration-in
-louisville-how-parents-and-students-see-the-gains-and-challenges/LOUISVILLE
finalV3_12711.pdf [http://perma.cc/VCW2-FBH3] (noting the significant sup-
port among Louisville parents for integrated schools in general and satisfaction
with the outcomes for their own children, and majority support for the district's
specific integration plan and its implementation); Kimberly Quick & Rebecca
Damante, Louisville, Kentucky: A Reflection on School Integration, CENTURY FOUND.
2, 4-11 (Sept. 15, 2016), http://tcf.org/content/report/louisville-kentucky-
reflection-school-integration [http://perma.cc/F5YC-BHFF] (noting a considera-
ble shift in attitudes from massive opposition to busing in suburban communities
to widespread support for diverse schools and "one of the most integrated districts
in the nation"); see also Richard D. Kahlenberg, School Integration in Practice: Les-
sons from Nine Districts, THE CENTURY FOUND. 5 (Oct. 14, 2016),
http://tcf.org/content/report/school
-integration-practice-lessons-nine-districts [http://perma.cc/VXM9-ULQ6] (dis-
cussing the question of building community support more generally).
141. See Halley Potter, Kimberly Quick & Elizabeth Davies, A New Wave of School Inte-
gration, CENTURY FOUND. (Feb. 9, 2016), http://tcf.org/assets/downloads/
ANewWavePotter.pdf [http://perma.cc/JMS5-6AXV].
142. See Suchi Saxena, New York City Public Schools: Small Steps in the Biggest District,
CENTURY FOUND. (Oct. 14, 2016), http://tcf.org/content/report/new-york-city-
public-schools [http://perma.cc/8KYA-JBJ41.
143. Kim Bridges, Eden Prairie Public Schools: Adapting to Demographic Change in the
Suburbs, CENTURY FOUND. (Oct. 14, 2016), http://s3-us-west-2.amazonaws.com/
production.tcf.orglapp/uploads/2016/10/13201138/EdenPrairiePublicSchools.pdf
[http://perma.cc/DYV7-QPXB].




might have been willing to pay a premium for private school on the theory that
it would help their children in college admissions might now be willing to send
their children to the nearby public school instead. The success of integration
programs like those in Hartford demonstrates that while not all white and Asian
middle- and high-income parents are willing to send their children to schools
with substantial numbers of black and Latinx low-income students, enough
families are willing to do so-again, when they perceive it to be in their inter-
est-to increase the degree of racial and economic integration. By providing in-
centives to integrate, this program would accelerate the pace of current efforts
and give rise to new ones.
This program is not proposed, and should not be seen, as a replacement for
other race- and class-conscious affirmative action programs. Efforts by colleges
to increase the number of their students who are Pell grant-eligible, for exam-
ple, are an essential part of increasing diversity on campus and reducing ine-
quality in society. Yet insofar as there are institutional constraints on such pipe-
line programs, however, it is unlikely that many competitive colleges will admit
classes of majority Pell-eligible students for the foreseeable future. This pro-
gram offers a potential pathway both to increasing diversity and to reducing in-
equality, within known constraints and within a reasonable time frame. Over
time, increased integration in K-12 schools will result in shifts in the socioeco-
nomic makeup of the student bodies admitted by these colleges. But this pro-
gram could have real benefits even if there was little to no such change in the
short term.
Take the example of a hypothetical student, David. David is the son of two
affluent professionals living in Connecticut. In Scenario 1, David's parents be-
lieve that the best way to ensure he will be admitted to an Ivy League college is
to send him to a nearby private prep school, Prep Academy (PA), where they
will pay $40,000 a year in tuition. PA is a prestigious, though not top-tier, prep
school, with a good teacher-to-student ratio and a forty-acre campus. The
school's student population is twenty percent students of color, but only 3.8
percent are FRPL-eligible. 45 David thrives academically and is admitted to his
first choice, Yale. In Scenario 2, David's parents hear46 that the nearby city's
145. This school's profile is modeled after Greens Farms Academy in Connecticut. For
the racial and ethnic diversity composition of the school, see Student Life: Diversi-
ty, GREENS FARMs AcAD., http://www.gfacademy.org/page.cfm?p=580
[http://perma.cc/DUA3-4RBE]. For tuition costs for school year 2017-18, see Ad-
mission: Affording GFA, GREENS FARMS ACAD., http://www.gfacademy.org/
page.cfm?p=574 [http://perma.cc/U3NU-L7QQ]. For FRPL eligibility, Connecticut
Schools Participating in The National School Lunch Program, CONN. STATE DEP'T
EDUc. 18 (Oct. 2008), http://www.sde.ct.gov/sde/lib/sde/pdf/rfp/rfp978
_oct08_fr-eligibility-percentages.pdf [http://perma.cc/KS5W-SJXG].
146. Social networks are often the primary means by which parents learn about schools.
See Roda & Wells, supra note 56, at 279-81.
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magnet school, Achievement Magnet (AM),'14 7 offers high-quality facilities and
education in an integrated environment. Lifelong Democrats, they like the idea
of integration (and of not paying $40,000 a year), but are worried that by send-
ing David to AM instead of PA, they would reduce his chance to get into the
college of his choice. AM has a slightly worse student-to-teacher ratio than PA
and doesn't have the same longstanding prestigious reputation as PA.
On their visit to the magnet school, after the admissions officer has shown
them the planetarium, she asks David's parents what his first-choice college is.
When they tell her Yale, she informs them that since AM has a student body
that is majority FRPL-eligible, David will get an automatic boost on his Yale
application. David attends AM, thrives academically, and is admitted to Yale. In
both scenarios, Yale admits David (as well as many other students of similar
backgrounds). However, the David in Scenario 2 has had significant experience
interacting with others from different racial and class backgrounds. In class-
rooms and on campus, he will be more likely to seek out and feel comfortable in
interactions with students from different backgrounds from his own.1' In addi-
tion, the energy, resources, and effort David's parents put into ensuring that he
gets a quality education will flow to and through AM rather than PA. Studies
suggest that the presence of students like David will also improve the academic
outcomes of students around him at AM, far more than they would have at
PA.149 Maintaining a sufficient number of students like David may also be a
quid pro quo for maintaining certain levels of public funding to the magnet
school. Finally, as more parents make decisions like David's, other parents learn
of this pathway to success.'5 o As a result, even Prep Academy will have an incen-
tive to admit a larger number of low-income students.51
147. This school's profile is modeled after Mary Hooker Environmental Sciences Mag-
net in Hartford. For FRPL eligibility, see Connecticut Schools Participating in the
National School Lunch Program, supra note 145, at 7.
148. See infra Section II.B.
149. Wells et al., supra note 15.
150. See supra note 146 and accompanying text.
151. To the extent that some private schools did so, this would have an important
benefit for the low-income students who were admitted as a result, as well as offer-
ing the benefits of a socioeconomically diverse education to the other students at
such schools. Yet given how few low-income students attend schools like Prep
Academy, it may be that among the more expensive private schools, only those
with the largest endowments would be in a financial position to admit sufficient
numbers of low-income students to qualify for the admissions bonus. From the
perspective of educational equality, this would not necessarily be a bad thing, as it
would reduce the competitive advantage that affluent parents could gain by plac-
ing their children in elite K-12 schools with few low-income students. Making
such schools less attractive unless they admitted sizeable numbers of low-income
students would on the whole be a step in the right direction, as it would reduce the




This hypothetical illustrates how this policy could benefit considerably
more students beyond the individual who was initially affected, that is, David.
Indeed, those other students are the intended primary beneficiaries of this poli-
cy. 15 In both scenarios, David ends up at Yale, but it is only in the latter that his
attendance of a socioeconomically integrated school has substantial collateral
benefits for a far greater number of low-income students than just himself. 3
This is part of why a plan whose effects could be so wide-ranging remains with-
in the realm of feasibility for institutions concerned about prestige and revenue.
At the extreme, even after adopting such a policy, Yale could continue to admit
roughly seventy percent of its students from families in the top twenty percent
of family income1 54-though this would certainly be problematic in itself from
the perspective of increasing equality in higher education-and yet still make a
substantial contribution to reducing educational inequality at the K-12 level by
having channeled those students into K- 12 schools with significant numbers of
low-income students.
The fact that this policy could operate within existing institutional con-
straints is part of what would make this plan palatable to status- and revenue-
conscious colleges, but it also brings out one potential concern about this pro-
gram. Particularly in the short term, such a policy could end up favoring mid-
dle-class white students from underrepresented schools over low-income or
historically underrepresented students from those same institutions. Over time,
however, increasingly integrated K- 12 schools will tend to produce more equal
outcomes than if they had remained segregated. Nonetheless, this risk high-
lights the importance of ensuring that this program is a complement to, rather
than a replacement for, existing forms of racial and socioeconomic affirmative
action. Preserving existing programs can help lessen this short-term effect.
However, to the extent that income and race will continue to correlate with
some of the quantitative measures of merit employment by colleges, the full
positive potential of this plan will be to some extent blunted by those admis-
sions criteria. This is indeed a drawback in terms of promoting equality, though
152. See Mickelson, supra note 112.
153. See supra note 15. I refer to low-income students as the primary beneficiaries,
since in both scenarios David attends a highly selective college (his chances of ad-
mission relative to low-income applicants could remain the same in scenarios 1
and 2, but in scenario 2 he would have improved chances relative to affluent appli-
cants who did not attend class-integrated schools), whereas it is only in Scenario 2
that a larger number of low-income students benefit from David and his parent's
resources and efforts being channeled through an integrated school.




YALE LAW & POLICY REVIEW
it is worth noting that this drawback remains true of virtually all sponsored
mobility and especially contest mobility programs.'
Another critique that might be leveled at this program is that it involves
large private and public institutions trying to change the behavior of millions of
private actors to fit the values of these institutions. Such a program could be ac-
cused of "social engineering," a criticism often leveled against affirmative action
programs in general. Though it is reasonable to be concerned about colleges
seeking to impose their values on society, this critique would seem to miss the
fact that colleges are already very much doing so. The criteria that colleges select
for in their admissions programs reflect what they consider to be a "good appli-
cant."'86 These are not value-neutral determinations,' and more importantly,
they have the effect of articulating norms about what is "good" and "desirable"
that are to a certain extent internalized by parents and students across the coun-
try. In this sense, colleges already engage in "social engineering." Indeed, any
large-scale education project will necessarily embody a vision of what kind of
society it seeks to produce. Accusations of "social engineering" should be
properly understood as concerned with the values pursued, not the mechanism
itself. The question, therefore, is not whether higher education should promote
values and thus incentives that will shape the larger educational system, but ra-
ther whether those values should be shifted in order to combat, rather than
promote, racial and economic inequality.
Another concern is that such a program could have the unintended effect
of resulting in the depopulation of poorer schools. If enough wealthier schools
began admitting historically unrepresented students, then poorer schools might
gradually lose students, and thus funding. The students remaining would per-
haps be worse off still.'* There are a few reasons to think that this would not be
a necessary consequence of the program. First, since the withdrawal of both
students and funding is the direct result of the district secession process de-
scribed above,5 9 to the extent that this policy would help counteract secession,
it would help avoid the defunding and depopulation of K-12 schools with sig-
nificant numbers of low-income students. Second, unless wealthier schools
were to increase their size substantially, bringing substantially larger numbers of
historically underrepresented students into wealthier schools would also have
155. Guinier, supra note 26, at 169 (noting how the Texas Ten Percent plan's limita-
tions are the same as those of sponsorship mobility programs).
156. See, e.g., Guinier, supra note 26, at 125-36.
157. Id.
158. There are analogous critiques of the desegregation program in Hartford and its
effect on neighborhood schools. See de la Torre, supra note 133. In Hartford, how-
ever, this is partly the result of certain idiosyncrasies of the program-such as the
"glass half full" approach that focuses on slightly under fifty percent of schools and
the emphasis on magnets-that would not apply to a bonus that applied to all
schools with over a certain level of low-income students.




the effect of distributing both higher-income and historically underrepresented
students more evenly across a relatively stable number of slots in various
schools (which would be limited by constraints on facilities, classroom size con-
cerns, geography, etc.). Thus, if a community had two schools, one with a his-
torically low-income student body (School A) and one with a historically high-
income student body (School B), if 50 students from historically underrepre-
sented backgrounds were recruited by School B, a roughly similar number of
higher-income students might end up being displaced to School A. This would
also be true if integration were achieved by redrawing school district lines.So
There is no doubt that in this process, the students displaced (and their parents)
might feel resentful of the process. However, this would be true of any program
that sought to desegregate by more equitably distributing educational resources,
which would inevitably mean dismantling certain relative privileges.
II. WHY SUCH A POLICY WOULD BE FEASIBLE FOR COLLEGES
As noted above, this policy would be feasible for colleges in part because it
could operate within existing institutional constraints. Colleges would stand to
gain on several fronts. First, many colleges understand (and present) themselves
as bearing important responsibilities to the public and society at large. Adopting
this policy would help colleges fulfill this mission by working to reduce educa-
tional inequality nationwide. Second, by increasing the number of students who
attend integrated K-12 schools, adopting this policy could help promote inclu-
sion on college campuses and better prepare students for leadership in an in-
creasingly diverse society, goals that colleges have long recognized as central to
their educational missions.
A. By Adopting this Policy, Colleges Could Live Up to Their Social Responsi-
bilities and Play a Positive Role in Reducing Educational Inequality Na-
tionwide
By rewarding middle- and high-income parents for sending their children
to schools with greater numbers of low-income students, colleges can help
promote K- 12 integration nationwide. This would have significant educational
benefits across society by affording a better education to more low-income stu-
dents and exposing an even greater number of students to intergroup contact
across class lines. 6' Over the medium term, these benefits would be reaped indi-
160. See Bridges, supra note 143, at 34-36.
161. See, e.g., Orfield et al., E Pluribus, supra note 1, at 9-10 (summarizing consensus of
research on desegregation indicating bias reductions, greater facility at intergroup
communication, increased academic achievement for minority students without a
corresponding decrease for white students, as well as long-term and even intergen-
erational effects); Wells et al., supra note 15, at 8-15 (summarizing research on the
benefits for all students, including the cognitive benefits of attending SES-
integrated schools, which include improved critical thinking and problem solving,
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rectly by colleges once again, since both a larger total number of applicants will
have received the benefits of an integrated K-12 education and a larger number
of students from disadvantaged backgrounds will have become more competi-
tive applicants on traditional metrics after attending schools with a higher pro-
portion of middle-class-and-up students. Even beyond these second-order ben-
efits, however, colleges should promote K- 12 integration as part of their
broader social responsibilities.
Higher education occupies a special place in our society, and this is reflect-
ed by how our society, government, and laws treat colleges. Part of this is that
such institutions are seen as serving a significant and valuable public role. It is
also a core part of their self-conception, as is reflected in the (admittedly gener-
ic) language of their mission statements.' But mission statements aside, in
truth many college presidents do express a broader educational responsibility
that extends outside the walls of their individual institutions.16 3 The fact that
their public mission is not their only one, and the imperfect ways in which they
serve it is, of course, becoming increasingly visible. Colleges have faced in-
creased criticism for their role in reproducing economic inequality, primarily
for rising tuition and admissions criteria that heavily privilege children from af-
fluent and well-educated families.16 4 Adopting this policy would help them
meaningfully respond to these critiques.
and the social benefits, which include reduced implicit bias and increased comfort
with intergroup contact, as well as the importance of school integration for reduc-
ing socioeconomic educational inequality).
162. In their mission statements, many colleges state that they see their role as serving
the public interest quite broadly defined. See, e.g., Brown's Mission, BROWN U.,
http://www.brown.edu/about/mission [http://perma.cc/5JZT-B948] ("The mis-
sion of Brown University is to serve the community, the nation, and the world.");
Mission and Integrity, U. MICH., http://www.accreditation.umich.edu/
mission/ [http://perma.cc/MJF2-SSLZ] ("The mission of the University of Michi-.
gan is to serve the people of Michigan and the world."); see also In Service of Hu-
manity, PRINCETON U., http://www.princeton.edu/meet-princeton/service
-humanity [http://perma.cc/ADZ5-CWBM] (quoting the President of Princeton
University Christopher Eisgruber that Princeton's "informal motto" is "Princeton
in the nation's service and the service of humanity"); Mission & Values, U. TEX.,
http://www.utexas.edu/about/mission-and-values [http://perma.cc/7U3G-ZSVM]
("The university preserves and promotes the arts, benefits the state's economy,
serves the citizens through public programs and provides other public service.").
163. EDUC. CONSERVANCY, supra note 64, at 4-7 (detailing the tension many college
presidents feel between pursuing competition between institutions and their edu-
cational mission).
164. See, e.g., BURD, supra note 54, at 7, 34 (summarizing for both private and public
colleges how merit-based aid practices are reducing accessibility for low-income
students); Brown-Nagin, supra note 6, at 468-72 (describing both the financial and
sociocultural impediments to college admissions for poorer students); Carnevale
& Strohl, supra note 54, at 94-95 (describing how certain metrics of academic




B. This Policy Would Help Promote Inclusion on Campus and Would Better
Prepare Students for Future Leadership
In addition to helping colleges fulfill their broader social commitments,
there are two further ways that colleges would stand to benefit in the short-term
from adopting this program. First, students admitted in part because of this bo-
nus will have benefitted from an integrated education, which will, among other
things, help contribute to greater inclusion on campus. Second, the policy
should result in a student body better prepared to fill a growing number of
leadership positions that require experience interacting with individuals from
diverse backgrounds. Both of these are concrete benefits colleges have long
sought to pursue. And both were recognized by the Supreme Court's decision
in Fisher I as values central to the educational mission of these institutions.
The concept of "critical mass," which has played a central role in litigation
over affirmative action,"' is predicated on a recognition of the importance of
inclusion beyond just numerical diversity. Promoting diversity on college cam-
puses is not limited to the quantifiable diversity of the student body; it is inte-
gral that this diversity exist within an environment of inclusion. The im-
portance of focusing on inclusion, and the progress that remains to be made,
has emerged with renewed urgency in the wake of protests by students of color
on college campuses across the country. Institutions have responded with a va-
riety of plans, which include steps like increasing faculty diversity and providing
more funding to cultural centers.'66 At the level of admissions, however, inclu-
sion is mostly fostered by some variant on the quantitative notion of a "critical
mass." This is unlikely to be sufficient in itself. Given the existing economic seg-
How the SAT Favors Rich, Educated Families, WASH. POST (Mar. 5, 2014),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2014/03/05/these-four
-charts-show-how-the-sat-favors-the-rich-educated-families [http://perma.cc/
K52R-X5WN]; Evan J. Mandery, Opinion, End College Legacy Preferences, N.Y.
TIMEs (Apr. 24, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/04/25/opinion/end-college
-legacy-preferences.html [http://perma.cc/X8UJ-CVYX] (describing the unequal
effects of legacy in college admissions); Josh Zumbrun, SAT Scores and Income In-
equality: How Wealthier Kids Rank Higher, WALL ST. J.: REAL TIME ECON. (Oct. 7,
2014), http://blogs.wsj.com/economics/2014/10/07/sat-scores-and-income
-inequality-how-wealthier-kids-rank-higher [http://perma.cc/8MJ9-KJ25].
165. See Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin (Fisher 1l), 136 S. Ct. 2198, 2210-13 (2016);
Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 335-41 (2003).
166. See Pathways to Diversity and Inclusion: An Action Plan for Brown University,
BROWN U. (Feb. 1, 2016), http://brown.edu/web/documents/diversity/actionplan/
diap-full.pdf [http://perma.cc/3XHR-DJ48]; Yale Launches Five-Year, $50 Million
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regation of K-12 schools in this country," so long as colleges continue to admit
primarily applicants from middle- and high-income backgrounds,' 6 their cam-
puses will be populated with a majority of students who spent their K-12 years
in schools with few low-income students, and a minority of students who spent
their K-12 years in schools with predominantly low-income students. This will
tend to lead to greater social distance between these two groups of students, to
the detriment of inclusion.6 * In contrast, this program offers a new way of
promoting integration on campus through admissions: by admitting a student
body with a larger proportion of students with long-term experience in class-
integrated educational settings.
The benefits of such experience are manifold. Most of the pedagogical ben-
efits of diversity served by the affirmative action programs of colleges, graduate
schools, and professional schools would also be served just as well, if not con-
siderably more effectively, at the K-12 level.' Some of the benefits of an inte-
grated education, such as academic improvements in grades and test scores,
may already be captured by existing metrics. This program aims to capture the
others.
Chief among these are the reductions in implicit prejudicial attitudes and
beliefs that result from sustained intergroup collaboration, for which there is
considerable social science evidence. In the most comprehensive study to
date,'7' a meta-analysis of data from 515 studies,"'7 authors Thomas Pettigrew
167. See, e.g., Owens et al., supra note 1; Reed Jordan, A Closer Look at Income and Race
Concentration in Public Schools, URB. INST. (May 13, 2015), http://www.urban.org/
features/closer-look-income-and-race-concentration-public-schools [http://perma
.cc/584C-HJUC] ("Nationwide about 40 percent of students in low-income fami-
lies (10 million) attend high-poverty schools, where more than 75 percent of stu-
dents come from low-income families. Only about 6 percent of students in low-
income families attend low-poverty schools, where less than 25 percent of students
come from low-income families. So, students in low-income families are over six
times more likely to attend a high-poverty school."); Orfield et al., E Pluribus, su-
pra note 1, at 25-27.
168. See Carnevale & Strohl, supra note 54, at 73 ("[O]nly 7 percent of high school
youth from the bottom quartile of SES, as measured by parental income, educa-
tion, and occupational status, get baccalaureate degrees."); see also Jason DeParle,
For Poor, Leap to College Often Ends in Hard Fall, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 22, 2012),
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/12/23/education/poor-students-struggle-as-class
-plays-a-greater-role-in-success.htnl [http://perma.cc/ZQ3R-Z29R]; Prez-Pefia,
supra note 81 (noting that at competitive colleges "only 14 percent of students
come from the lower 50 percent of families by income").
169. Brown-Nagin, supra note 6, at 472 (listing difficulties faced by students from less
affluent backgrounds on campuses, including greater social anxiety and distance).
170. See Wells et al., supra note 15, at 11-15.
171. Thomas F. Pettigrew & Linda R. Tropp, A Meta-Analytic Test of Intergroup Contact
Theory, 90 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL., 751, 752-54 (2006). This research




and Linda Tropp concluded that "[t]he meta-analytic results clearly indicate
that intergroup contact typically reduces intergroup prejudice."'a The consen-
sus around the findings of this research is reflected by the American Psychologi-
cal Association's amicus brief in Fisher II.17 4 This effect obtains across many in-
group/out-group distinctions, ranging from race and ethnicity to class and dis-
ability.'7 5 And the prejudice-reducing benefits typically "generalize beyond par-
ticipants in the immediate contact situation," thus being carried forward over
time.176
The benefits of intergroup contact are already recognized as important
pedagogical benefits at the college level.'7 Moreover, studies in social psycholo-
gy give us reason to believe that the earlier and longer-term this exposure to in-
tergroup contact, the more powerful and long-lasting the positive effects of bias
reduction."'8 Exposing students to intergroup contact early may serve to help
cant improvement over previous meta-studies, which had used considerably
smaller and in other ways incomplete samples, lacked strict inclusion rules, and
utilized primarily non-quantitative assessments of past scholarship. Pettigrew and
Tropp's meta-analysis represents an improvement on all of those terms, and also
controls for potential publication bias.
172. The studies cumulatively represent a total participation of 250,089 individuals
from thirty-eight nations. Id. at 753.
173. Id. at 766.
174. Brief of the American Psychological Association in Support of Respondents as
Amicus Curiae, Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 136 S.Ct. 533 (2015) (No. 14-
981), 2015 WL 6735840 at *34 [hereinafter APA brief].
175. Pettigrew & Tropp, supra note 171, at 766 ("These results support the recent ex-
tension of intergroup contact theory to a variety of intergroup contexts, beyond its
original focus on racial and ethnic groups. In sum, our meta-analytic results pro-
vide substantial evidence that intergroup contact can contribute meaningfully to
reductions in prejudice across a broad range of groups and contexts.").
176. Id.
177. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 330.
178. Nilanjana Dasgupta, Implicit Attitudes and Beliefs Adapt to Situations: A Decade of
Research on the Malleability of Implicit Prejudice, Stereotypes, and the Self-Concept,
in ADVANCES IN EXPERIMENTAL SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY, 233, 240 (Patricia Devine &
Ashley Plant eds., 2013) (noting that inversely, prejudice unchallenged by inter-
group contact early on can be persistent, and may be carried'from context to con-
text: "Once aroused, negative emotions can unwittingly carry over from one local
environment to another and increase implicit prejudice against specific social
groups"); Nilanjana Dasgupta & Luis M. Rivera, When Social Context Matters: The
Influence of Long-Term Contact and Short-Term Exposure to Admired Outgroup
Members on Implicit Attitudes and Behavioral Intentions, 26 SOC. COGNITION 112,
119-21 (2008) (finding that in the case of implicit bias against gay and lesbian in-
dividuals, long-term contact predicted significantly less implicit prejudice and
would also render new contacts more likely to reduce implicit bias).
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"inoculate" individuals against prejudicial attitudes,'79 which may be particular-
ly important given that such attitudes can develop at a young age.' Thus, it
may be an even more effective path to what the Grutter Court called the "im-
portant and laudable"'' educational benefits of intergroup contact than expo-
sure that occurs only later in life on college campuses. This is not to imply that
the search for diversity on campus should be replaced by integration at the K- 12
level. Instead, it is to highlight how taking past experience of intergroup contact
into account in admissions can further colleges' goal of creating a diverse and
inclusive campus.
Colleges' long-standing commitment to the pedagogical benefits of diversi-
ty in overcoming group stereotypes and increasing intergroup understanding,
and the policies they have instituted as a result, will be substantially furthered
by adopting this program. Admitting students with significant lived experience
of intergroup contact will better foster inclusion on campus. College students
who attended class-integrated (and thus more likely to be racially integrated as
well) K-12 schools will have more experience of and greater receptivity to inter-
group contact, which will have an effect through interactions both large and
small. This would tend to make campuses more welcoming and less alienating
places for individuals from underrepresented backgrounds. Of course, an inclu-
sive atmosphere is certainly not the entirety of the value of diversity, and this
program's benefits on campuses also depend on the existence of quantitative
diversity within the student body."'
Colleges have also long recognized that diverse student bodies are necessary
to prepare their graduates for leadership roles in the increasingly diverse United
States of the twenty-first century, as well as the global marketplace. Social sci-
ence research indicates that receiving an education in a diverse environment
helps students develop leadership skills.18 3 In the Grutter litigation, this leader-
179. Dasgupta, supra note 178, at 257, 271-72.
18o. See Andrew Scott Baron & Mahzarin R. Banaji, The Development of Implicit Atti-
tudes: Evidence of Race Evaluations from Ages 6 and 10 and Adulthood, 17 PSYCHOL.
Sci. 53, 55-58 (2006) (finding the presence of implicit pro-white bias among white
children at age 6).
181. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 329-33 (describing the "important and laudable" pedagogical
benefits of diversity).
182. The interaction and potential tension between this program and existing affirma-
tive action programs are discussed infra Section III.D.
183. See, e.g., Anthony L. Antonio, The Role of Interracial Interaction in the Development
of Leadership Skills and Cultural Knowledge and Understanding, 42 RES. HIGHER
EDUC. 593, 607 (2001) (finding a positive relationship between interracial interac-
tion and leadership ability); Nicholas A. Bowman, How Much Diversity Is Enough?
The Curvilinear Relationship Between College Diversity Interactions and First-Year
Student Outcomes, 54 RES. HIGHER EDuc. 874, 886-87 (2013) (finding, inter alia,
that "[o]verall diversity interactions are also positively and significantly associated
with growth in leadership skills, intellectual engagement, and intercultural effec-




ship rationale for diversity argument was buttressed by a slew of amicus briefs
from major businesses, professional associations, and retired military officers.'8 *
If anything, this has only become truer with time, as can be seen in the ava-
lanche of amicus briefs to the Court in support of affirmative action in Fisher
II." Private and public colleges,"' Fortune 100 companies ranging from Wal-
Mart to Apple,"' and the Department of Defense,' 8 among many others, ech-
oed the same theme: It is becoming ever more important that those who will
assume future leadership positions, in either the public or private sectors, have
received an education in a diverse environment. The breadth of support for this
position from across society is compelling testimony of its importance. Once
again, there is reason to think this would be even more effectively realized at the
K-12 level, and that doing so would increase the ability to foster an environ-
ment of inclusion and diversity on college campuses themselves. 8 9 This pro-
gram would help colleges produce graduates prepared for leadership roles in a
changing world, as well as with a greater sense of civic engagement.'90
Educational Benefits of Interaction Across Racial Boundaries, 50 J.C. STUDENT DEV.
67, 78 (2009).
184. Indeed, the majority in Grutter referred favorably to several of these amicus briefs.
Grutter, 539 U.S. at 330-33.
185. See generally Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 136 S. Ct. 2198 (2016).
186. Brief of Brown University et al. in Support of Respondents, Fisher v. University of
Texas at Austin, 136 S. Ct. 533 (2015) (No. 14-981), 2015 WL 6690032, at *3-4
("[U]niversities continue to have a compelling interest in ensuring that their stu-
dent bodies reflect a robust diversity that enriches the educational experience for
all students and also prepares them to be active, capable citizens and leaders in a
complex and heterogeneous nation and world.").
187. Brief of Fortune-100 and Other Leading American Businesses as Amici Curiae in
Support of Respondents, Fisher v. University of Texas at Austin, 136 S. Ct. 533
(2015) (No. 14-981), 2015 WIL 6735839, at *7.
188. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents, Fisher v.
University of Texas at Austin, 136 S. Ct. 533 (2015) (No. 14-981), 2015 WL
6735838 at * 9-10.
189. These briefs are in support of race-conscious affirmative action policies, while the
program advocated in this paper focuses instead on class diversity. However, for
reasons discussed further in Section III.D, there is good reason to believe that
there will be a great deal of overlap between the effects of such programs.
190. APA Brief, supra note 174, at *34 ("Intergroup contact, which is possible only in
diverse settings, generally improves cross-group interacting skills, motivates civic
engagement, and promotes 'greater openness to and understanding of diverse
people.'").
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C. The Feasibility of Coordination Between Colleges
In order for this plan to work, the message sent needs to be broadcast suffi-
ciently loudly for parents, students, and high school guidance counselors to
hear it and heed it. It would therefore be ideal for colleges to coordinate so that
the message sent will be coherent and conspicuous enough to be acted upon.
Given the atmosphere of competition among colleges, such coordination is not
a foregone conclusion.'9' Indeed, institutions will likely be wary of shifting their
application criteria in ways that they perceive might give other institutions a leg
up in the rankings.
Yet there is also clearly a desire among many colleges to show that they are
aware of the flaws with the current admissions system and are working to im-
prove it.1 92 Within this context, there is room for cooperation. Turning the Tide
illustrates how widespread coordination among colleges in the realm of admis-
sion is feasible. 93 Turning the Tide was signed on to by dozens of colleges and
administrators.1 94 Another example of such coordination is the American Talent
Initiative.9 5 As was true in both these instances, buy-in from some of the most
selective colleges would be particularly helpful. Not only do institutions across
the country often look to the most selective colleges in crafting their own ad-
missions policies, but it could lessen first-mover concerns if some of the most
191. See, e.g., EDUC. CONSERVANCY, supra note 64, at 4-7 (detailing how many college
presidents have concerns about the educational effects of rising competition be-
tween colleges over enrollment, but feel limited in their ability to act in isolation
by the high degree of competitiveness itself); see also SCHULZ & LUCIDO, supra note
64, at 3-5, 8-9, 14 (describing the history of increasing competition between col-
leges over prestige and students, summarizing research into the different methods
by which colleges compete, and tracking the rise of an enrollment consulting in-
dustry to meet the demands of this competition); Bill Destler, Competition and the
Rising Cost of Higher Education, HUFFINGTON POST (Nov. 10, 2012),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/bill-destler/college-competition
-_b_1867165.html [http://perma.cc/C69C-Z9XT] (offering one college president's
account of rising competition). Indeed, some enrollment management companies
directly market to colleges based on a message that competition is rising. See
Brandon B. A. Miller, Competition for Students is Heating Up. But Colleges and
Universities Have Options, ELLUCIAN (Nov. 26, 2014), http://www
.ellucian.com/Blog/Competition-for-Students-is-Heating-Up---But-Colleges
-and-Universities-Have-Options/ [http://perma.cc/HF94-SF5C].
192. See EDUC. CONSERVANCY, supra note 64, at 4-7,14-20; cf MAKING CARING
COMMON, supra note 72, at 22-23 (the fact that dozens of colleges who signed on
to both the critiques and prescriptions in Turning the Tide indicates a receptivity
to cooperation and reform).
193. See MAKING CARING COMMON, supra note 72.
194. Id.





competitive actors in the space signed on.196 Furthermore, the most selective
colleges will often have the greatest degree of leeway in determining their appli-
cation criteria. While other schools may strive to snag applicants with sufficient
quantitative credentials like GPA or test scores (or who will be best situated to
pay), the most selective colleges often have a considerably larger number of
qualified applicants than they could possibly admit.' 7 It is therefore plausible
that such institutions might be willing to coordinate around a program like the
one advocated in this piece-so long as they understood it to fit within what
they regarded as their institutional constraints and to be aligned with their ob-
jectives. The publication of federal guidelines or benchmarks could help facili-
tate such coordination between colleges, and offer a concrete target for institu-
tions to aim towards.**
III. How SUCH A POLICY COULD BE DESIGNED TO BEST PROMOTE K-12 INTE-
GRATION AND INCLUSION ON COLLEGE CAMPUSES
Now that the general benefits of such a program have been outlined, the
question then becomes how to design it. In this section I will argue that in order
to best promote this policy's goals of integration and inclusion, the most effec-
tive form would be an admissions bonus to students who attended schools who
for over six years at which over 40 percent of the students were eligible for Free
or Reduced Price Lunches (FRPL), contingent upon the school meeting a con-
text-specific standard for intraschool integration. This is not the only possibility
for how such a program could operate, however, and in this section I will dis-
cuss both why this would be the optimal form, as well as other potential options
196. To the extent that the most selective colleges serve as pacesetters within the college
admissions world, if the several highly selective colleges were to adopt the policy
advocated by this piece, it would signal that they consider this is a feasible policy,
put pressure on other colleges seeking to show their commitment to educational
equality, and reduce concerns that in adopting such a policy colleges might fall be-
hind the top-tier schools.
197. HARRY LEwIS, EXCELLENCE WITHOUT A SOUL: DOES LIBERAL EDUCATION HAVE A
FUTURE? 10 (2006) (the former Dean of Harvard College illustrates the idea that
"[e]ven if academic talent were the only admissions criterion, objective tests are far
too insensitive to distinguish among the students in the Harvard application pool"
by noting that "[v]aledictorians are a dime a dozen at Harvard-the admissions
office could fill the whole class with them if it wanted to.").
198. For example, the Obama White House's Increasing College Opportunity for Low-
Income Students: Promising Models and a Call to Action helped provide a target for
colleges seeking to demonstrate their commitment to increasing equality of access
at the level of higher education. See 9 for 9: Yale Meets Commitments to Increase
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and the empirical determinations and value choices implicated by different
choices of metric.
A. Finding an Appropriate Metric
The debate over the merits of affirmative action in colleges on the basis of
class as opposed to race is a complex one.' 99 Though it is outside of the scope of
this piece to attempt to intervene in this general debate, there is a strong argu-
ment that socioeconomic affirmative action alone is likely insufficient to ad-
dress the deep problems of racial inequality in our society.20 Nonetheless,
many advocates of race-based affirmative action also accept the value of socio-
economic affirmative action, either because it may be less legally vulnerable and
more politically feasible,"o' or because it would target certain specific forms of
inequality more directly than race.2 0 2 In the specific plan envisaged by this piece,
it seems feasible to use socioeconomic status, rather than race, as a metric. First,
for a combination of geographic and demographic reasons, it may simply be
unworkable for K- 12 schools in various rural regions of the country to become
racially integrated.2 0 3 This means that students from these regions would be
199. For a summary of the arguments in favor of replacing race-conscious affirmative
action with purely socioeconomic affirmative action, see KAHLENBERG, supra note
69, at 12-25. For an argument that both socioeconomic and race-conscious af-
firmative action should coexist, see, for example, Anthony P. Carnevale & Stephen
J. Rose, Socioeconomic Status, Race/Ethnicity, and Selective College Admissions, in
AMERICA'S UNTAPPED RESOURCE: Low-INCOME STUDENTS IN HIGHER EDUCATION
101 (R. Kahlenberg ed. 2014). Several state universities, including Texas, argued as
part of the Fisher litigation that socioeconomic affirmative action alone would be
insufficient, which was expressly accepted by the Court in Fisher I.
2oo. Indeed, the Supreme Court accepted this argument by Texas in Fisher II. Fisher v.
Univ. of Texas at Austin, 136 S. Ct. 2198, 2211-12 (2016). Examples of successful
socioeconomic integration reveal that it is not always a perfect replacement for
race-conscious affirmative action. See, e.g., McMillian et al., Can Class-Based Sub-
stitute for Race-Based Student Assignment Plans? Evidence From Wake County,
North Carolina, URBAN ED. 1, 14-18 (2015) (discussing how socioeconomic deseg-
regation can help with racial desegregation, but also why it may not be a full sub-
stitute, and finding that the data "suggest a modest increase in the degree of Black-
White segregation across Wake County schools under the socioeconomic-based
plan").
201. As is the case with, for example, the ten percent component of the Texas Ten Per-
cent plan. See Guinier, supra note 26, at 162-71.
202. As is the case with, for example, admissions policies that grant affirmative action
to first generation professionals or Pell-eligible students. See Brown-Nagin, supra
note 6, at 466-97.
203. For example, as of 2015, there were fourteen states where over 80% of the popula-





placed at an effective disadvantage in admissions, a counter-productive result
from the point of view of increasing diversity on campus. Second, the use of
race as a factor could potentially expose colleges to legal challenge, and could
potentially expose K- 12 schools to liability as they sought to meet the eligibility
criteria for this program, as will be discussed further in Section V. For these rea-
sons and others, many of the new integration projects at the K- 12 level focus on
markers of socioeconomic status, rather than race.2 0 4
The use of a socioeconomic metric, however, does not mean that this pro-
gram is concerned solely with the problem of socioeconomic segregation in K-
12 schools. Rather, the use of an economic metric should be understood as the
most effective form such a program could take to address the deeply intercon-
nected problems of racial and economic segregation at the K- 12 level.2 05 For ex-
ample, in 2012-2013, 45 percent of black and Hispanic students attended
schools classified as "high poverty" by the National Center for Educational Sta-
206tistics, while this was true of only 8 percent of white students.o7 Thus, be-
cause it would provide an incentive for desegregation at the level of both K- 12
and higher education, this proposal does not force a fundamental choice be-
tween race and class-based affirmative action, but rather pursues one of the two
in a way that will tend to simultaneously further the other.os Indeed, as is true
[http://perma.cc/DK7S-EJ8B]. More generally, the rural population of the United
States remains considerably more non-Hispanic white than the population as a
whole. See, e.g., Rural Research Brief, Hous. ASSISTANCE COUNCIL 9 (Apr. 2012),
http://www.ruralhome.org/storage/research-notes/rrn-race-and-ethnicity-web
.pdf [http://perma.cc/DN8Q-VUHF].
204. See Potter et al., supra note 141; Wells et al., supra note 15.
205. See Orfield et al., E Pluribus, supra note 1. It may even be that certain diversity cri-
teria employed by schools, such as "students of color," do a poor job of capturing
concerns about under-representation and economic inequality. As noted above, a
private school with 20 percent students of color included only 3.8 percent of stu-
dents who were free and reduced lunch eligible. See supra note 145.
206. Table, Number and Percentage Distribution of Public School Students, By Percentage
of Students in School Who are Eligible for Free or Reduced-Price Lunch, School Level,
Locale, and Student Race/Ethnicity: 2012-13, NAT'L CTR. EDUC. STATS., http://nces
.ed.gov/programs/digest/dl4/tables/dtl4_216.60.asp [http://perma.cc/V6TK
-VBPG] (defining high poverty schools as those where more than 75 percent of the
student body are eligible for FRPL).
207. Tom Snyder & Lauren Musu-Gillette, Free or Reduced Price Lunch: A Proxy for
Poverty, NCES BLOG (Apr. 16, 2015), http://nces.ed.gov/blogs/nces/post/free-or
-reduced-price-lunch-a-proxy-for-poverty [http://perma.cc/8V85-2KQL]; NAT'L
CTR. EDUC. STATS., supra note 206.
208. Kahlenberg, supra note 15, at 1556 (2007) (noting that given the intersection of
race and poverty in the segregation of schools, "policies that break up concentra-
tions of poverty will disproportionately affect African Americans"); Jennifer
Ayscue, Erica Frankenberg & Genevieve Siegel-Hawley, The Complementary Bene-
fits of Racial and Socioeconomic Diversity in Schools, NAT'L COAL. ON SCHL.
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with both the Texas Ten Percent Plan and affirmative action for first-generation
professionals, this proposal would be complementary with race-conscious af-
firmative action programs.
If economic status is to be the salient metric, there are two basic ways this
could be done: the plan could use the average socioeconomic profile of the stu-
dent body or the percentage of students below a certain income level. The first
option would offer a general picture of the income-level of a school, and thus
would indirectly reflect SES-integration. But even using a median instead of a
mean would offer an imperfect proxy, as schools that were integrated between
high- and low- income students might be indistinguishable from schools that
were almost entirely middle-income students. A more sophisticated measure
like a GINI-coefficient, often used to measure inequality, could again indirectly
tell us how economically unequal, and thus diverse, a school was. But it might
also have trouble distinguishing between a school that was unequal between su-
per rich and middle-income and a school that was unequal between middle-
and low-income. Such a program would also not confer benefits on predomi-
nantly low-income schools, a problem that I will discuss further later in this
section.
In order to maximally target those most disadvantaged by our current sys-
tem, the most workable proxy would therefore be the percentage of a school's
students who meet the familiar government-established criteria for eligibility
for free and reduced-price lunches. It would be difficult and perhaps intrusive
for K-12 schools to seek accurate information about the family incomes of the
students attending their schools from any other source, and we might also wor-
ry that a system that relied on the schools for data collection might be suscepti-
ble to deceit. FRPL information comes from the federal government, and pairs
federally reported household income with the poverty line, revised annually to
account for shifts in the Consumer Price Index.o9 The threshold for free lunch-
es is 130% of the poverty line; for reduced lunches it is 185%."o For example,
for 2017, the poverty line for a family of four is $24,600.n A household annual
income of $31,980 or less would currently be the threshold for free lunches, and
$45,510 for reduced ones." There is no requirement to participate in the Na-
tional School Lunch Program, but around 94 percent of public and private
DIVERSITY (Mar. 2017) http://school-diversity.org/pdf/DiversityResearch
BriefNol0.pdf [http://perma.cc/PPS4-CU4H]. But see McMillian et al., supra note
200, at 14-18 (noting the limitation of focusing on SES alone).








schools across the country choose to do so.213 Rather than relying on parental
applications, school districts or state agencies since 2008-09 have determined
eligibility through "direct certification," obtaining records of households that
receive food benefits, have foster children, or are enrolled in federal welfare
programs like WIC or TANF, and matching those against the lists of students.14
The benefits of using FRPL as a measure of poverty are manifold, given its
extensive use and its reliance on federal statistics. Indeed, FRPL continues to be
the primary measure of choice for education researchers seeking to study stu-
dent poverty nationwide at the school level. 5 Using FRPL avoids the fuzziness
of other definitions of low-income used in the context of higher education,
which can vary widely and reach as high as a $60,000 to $75,000 annual in-
come."' As such, legislators and researchers have often used it as a proxy."'
This practice is not without its critics. First, using FRPL as measures of in-
dividual poverty can be distorting, since some schools with over 40 percent
FRPL-eligible students receive permission from the government to offer FRPL
to all their students under the Community Eligibility Provision."' This is not
relevant here, however, since schools with over 40 percent FRPL-eligible stu-
dents would be eligible for the admissions boost.' 9 Second, high school stu-
dents participate in the program at a lower rate because of the stigma associated
with it. Though the extent of this effect is disputed,"2 since this program would
213. KATHERINE RALSTON ET AL., U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC., THE NATIONAL SCHOOL LUNCH
PROGRAM: BACKGROUND, TRENDS, AND ISSUE 1 (2008), http://naldc.nal.usda.gov/
download/19460/PDF [http://perma.cc/5HAY-Q3Q5].
214. Clare McCann, National School Lunch Program, EDCENTRAL, http://www
.edcentral.org/edcyclopedia/national-school-lunch-program/ [http://perma.cc/
8A8E-RVVT].
215. Sarah D. Sparks, Popular Child-Poverty Measure Gets Another Look, EDUC. WEEK
(Aug. 19, 2014), http://www.edweek.org/ew/articles/2014/08/20/01poverty
measures.h34.html [http://perma.cc/ZY4V-2AB7] (detailing how the use of FRPL
as a proxy remains ubiquitous, though efforts are underway to find more accurate
measures, but noting that there are various concerns about these new measures as
well, and none of them as yet provide the national level individual school infor-
mation that FRPL does).
216. Brown-Nagin, supra note 6, at 473 (noting that the 'low-income' concept, it turns
out, is strikingly imprecise terminology").
217. See id.; Michael Harwell & Brandon LeBeau, Student Eligibility for a Free Lunch as
an SES Measure in Education Research, 39 EDUC. RESEARCHER 120, 122-23 (2010).
218. Will Huntsberry, True or False? Free and Reduced-Price Lunch = Poor?, NAT'L PUB.
RADIO (Jan. 30, 2015), http://www.npr.org/sections/ed/2015/01/30/379330001/
true-or-false-free-and-reduced-price-lunch-poor [http://perma.cc/D54L-9SHG].
219. However if the program was designed as range, such as 40%-60%, this would be
less true.
220. The extent to which this is a product of stigma rather than reduced eligibility is
also disputed, as the average household incomes of older students were also high-
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look at eligibility determined through direct certification, rather than participa-
tion, this distortion would not matter for our purposes. Third, federal poverty
guidelines are themselves an imperfect variable.' The debate over poverty
lines, the fact that they do not include in-kind benefits, and that they are not
sufficiently tailored to geographic differences in Consumer Price Index is
somewhat relevant here. Several of the critiques, however, are focused more on
the shortcomings of the poverty line as a measure of absolute poverty, rather
than the relative disadvantage we would be interested in from the standpoint of
reducing segregation, which is a metric of relative inequality. And fourth, there
is evidence that school eligibility determinations are incorrect. Though some
studies found that up to twenty percent of students had been incorrectly found
eligible, these studies all pre-date mandatory direct certification and many of
the causes of error were attributable to the application process.2" Studies of er-
rors in direct certification found considerably lower rates, from six to nine per-
cent. 3 FRPL is therefore an imperfect measure of poverty. However, in the ab-
sence of another nationwide indicator of socioeconomic status matched with
the student bodies of different schools, these imperfections should not over-
shadow its value. For this very reason, FRPL continues to be widely used, de-
spite its recognized shortcomings.
Therefore, it is likely that most effective and accurate metric for this policy
would be once a school had reached above a certain level of FRPL-eligible stu-
dents. Of course, this program does not remain wedded to any particular met-
ric, and any improvements upon the metric advocated here would only im-
prove the program itself. The threshold number itself will inevitably be
somewhat arbitrary, and more research and discussion with relevant stakehold-
ers would be necessary before providing a firm answer. Something in the range
of 25 percent might represent erring on the side of breadth, as it would include
schools accounting for roughly 79.4 percent of students.1 4 Setting it at 50 per-
cent would cover all schools deemed "mid" to "high" poverty by the NCES,
which account for around 50.8 percent of students." There will be a trade-off
between ensuring that the category includes schools that are meaningfully inte-
grated and ensuring that this category is limited enough for the benefit to have
an impact. A review of the FRPL eligibility percentages across participating
er, in part because lower-income students are more likely to drop out. Ralston et
al, supra note 213, at 13.
221. Harwell & LeBeau, supra note 217, at 123-24.
222. Id.
223. Id. at 125.
224. NAT'L CTR. EDUC. STATS., supra note 206; Orfield et al., E Pluribus, supra note 1, at
vii (noting that "the typical black student is now in a school where almost two out
of every three classmates (64%) are low income, nearly double the level in schools
of the typical white or Asian student (37% and 39%, respectively)").




Connecticut schools shows that a threshold of 50% may cut off a number of
schools we may wish to include, include several of the Hartford magnet schools,
whose FRPL eligibility is in the mid-40s.22 6 On the other hand, if the boost was
given too widely, it might lose some of its force as an incentive, as it would al-
ready apply to the majority of students."' Therefore it may be useful to aim, at
least initially, for a number somewhere between 40 and 50 percent. The ques-
tion of whether there should also be a cut-off on the top-end, i.e. if the metric
should include a percentage above which a school's students would no longer
receive this admissions bonus is a complex one, and I will address it in greater
detail below.
There is also the question of how many years students would need to attend
an eligible school to qualify for this admissions bonus. One solution would be
to limit the benefit to elementary school, which would represent an earlier in-
tervention and might be more feasible.' Another solution would be to choose
a number of years, independent of level of schooling. Any number will be
somewhat arbitrary, and there is a balance here between expanding the scope of
eligibility and allowing for some flexibility on one hand (including allowing
parents of children currently in nonintegrated affluent schools to opt in), and
ensuring that students spend a meaningful number of years in an SES-
integrated setting, on the other. Six years seems like a potential middle path,
representing either a full elementary school education or a full high school edu-
cation. Though with that in mind, perhaps seven years would be a way of allow-
ing for flexibility while ensuring that some of each stage of a student's education
takes place in the relevant environment-and it might also be that once a stu-
dent has spent a year somewhere, they will be less likely to want to switch. Or
the program could start with four years, to make it easier for older students to
participate at the outset, before increasing the number of years over time once
the program was in place. 9
As to the size of such a boost that would be necessary to meaningfully in-
fluence the K- 12 preferences of parents, it is difficult to ex ante anticipate how
large a boost would be necessary. As such a program has yet to be adopted,
there is not a great deal of empirical evidence indicating one way or another.
However, the observed K-12 integration produced by both the Texas Ten Per-
cent plan and various efforts at voluntary integration do indicate that parents
are indeed susceptible to such incentives.2 3 o
226. Connecticut Schools Participating in The National School Lunch Program, supra note
145, at 6-7.
227. Orfield et al., E Pluribus, supra note 1, at 7.
228. There is a lower absolute number of free and reduced lunch eligible students in
. secondary schools. See NAT'L CTR. EDUC. STATS., supra note 206.
229. I am grateful to Professor Sam Erman for this suggestion.
230. See supra notes 119-134 and accompanying text.
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B. Why Other Metrics Would Be Less Effective at Promoting K-12 Integration
To show why using the percentage of students who are FRPL-eligible would
be more effective at promoting integration than other metrics, it may be useful
to compare the plan advocated here with two other proposals in the literature
that suggest using college admissions to incentivize integration. Danielle Allen
has suggested that using applicants' ZIP codes could incentivize more affluent
families to move to poorer neighborhoods2 31 and David Orentlicher has sug-
gested that all colleges nationwide, private and public alike, only admit appli-
cants who placed in the top ten percent of their high school classes.2 32 Though
both proposals are intriguing, and offer evidence for how college admissions
could be used to incentivize integration, neither proposal would likely be as ef-
fective as the proposal advanced here.
It is likely true that, as Allen notes, if colleges were to reserve slots for stu-
dents from certain ZIP+4233 codes, some parents with resources might seek to
strategically move to these areas.2 34 However, while neighborhoods can be valu-
able indicators of socioeconomic status and opportunity, they would likely be
less effective proxies than K-12 schools, with the result that they would be less
accurate at targeting socioeconomic inequality and provide less powerful incen-
tives to increase integration. There are three principal reasons why.
First, neighborhoods may be an imperfect proxy for social or educational
integration, as parents with resources could live in a ZIP+4 code that was non-
affluent on average but send their children to an elite private school.' And
ZIP+4 code lines may also be drawn in ways that do not reflect the types of dis-
advantage we might wish to target, or the types of social integration we might
wish to foster.3 6 This might be particularly true in large metropolitan areas,
which are loci of some of the most severe educational segregation. 37 K-12
schools, on the other hand, will generally (and especially when Allport's fac-
tors238 are present) involve a greater degree of social contact. Second, schools
would provide easier units for parents to understand and to pursue, whereas the
231. Allen, supra note 71, at 145-59.
232. Orentlicher, supra note 41, at 111-14.
233. Allen, supra note 71, at 147. A more precise ZIP code level that Allen suggests us-
ing for increased accuracy.
234. Allen, supra note 71, at 145-59.
235. See Reardon & Yun, supra note 45, at 1585-86.
236. Indeed there is some evidence that residential integration will not necessarily lead
to school integration. See Orfield et al., E Pluribus, supra note 1, at 10; Reardon &
Yun, supra note 45, at 1571-85.
237. See, e.g., Orfield et al., E Pluribus, supra note 1, at 9 (describing the severe racial
segregation in large metropolitan areas).




socioeconomic features of a specific ZIP+4 is likely not something many indi-
viduals are familiar with. While the percentage of a school's student body who
are FRPL-eligible will also not necessarily be common knowledge, schools as
actors would have a direct interest in spreading this information to parents and
students, acting as informational middlemen. Third, neighborhoods, unlike
schools, are typically not unitary actors. While a wealthy school could take ad-
vantage of the plan advocated in this piece in a coordinated manner by admit-
ting more low-income students, it might not be possible for a wealthy neigh-
borhood to act in a coordinated manner to do the same (especially if a certain
percentage of the inhabitants of the neighborhood were childless or had adult
children and thus were not receptive to education-oriented incentives).
There are also serious question about whether a top ten percent program,
such as Texas' Ten Percent Plan (TPP) would be feasible at a nationwide level.
Orentlicher proposes that all selective colleges across the country limit them-
selves to only admitting applications from the top ten percent of their respective
high school classes.23 9 On this plan, colleges would only admit students who
were in the top ten percent, but within that set of applicants, colleges would be
free to use their own criteria.2" Recognizing that this alone would inevitably re-
sult in a situation where elite colleges would only admit students in the top ten
percent of elite high schools, Orentlicher states that colleges would have to en-
sure that "the odds of admission from any one high school were similar to the
odds of admission from other high schools."4'
However, it is unclear how smaller private schools could ever make such a
guarantee, or even how large public schools could do so once their class of ap-
plicants was nationwide. 42 It seems like the most predictable result would be
that colleges who were already drawing from the top ten percent of students (if
not much higher) at elite high schools would simply continue to do so. This is-
sue is inevitable to the extent that a similar advantage is given to top-ten stu-
dents across all high schools, affluent and poor alike. The program advocated in
this piece avoids this problem, because it grants a benefit only to schools with
above a threshold percentage of FRPL-eligible students, rather than treating the
top students in all high schools alike.
Scaling a top ten percent program nationwide would also likely accentuate
concerns that are less problematic at the state level. If implemented in full by all
239. Orentlicher, supra note 41, at 111-14. Orentlicher notes that the exact percentage
could vary from college to college, depending on size. Id. However, the smaller the
percentage, the more these problems would be magnified.
240. Id. at 113.
241. Id.
242. There simply are not enough spots in these colleges to provide anything like equal
results to all high schools across the country. Asking college officials to make an
abstract commitment to treat all high schools equally would be difficult to verify
and raise coordination problems if colleges thought that others were not playing
fair.
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(or even by most) colleges, Orentlicher's proposal would consign 90% of all
students to non-eligibility to all (or most) selective colleges nationwide. While
the TTP itself might raise similar worries within Texas, in its present form it in-
cludes two escape valves. First, a current Texas high school student in the bot-
tom ninety percent of their class remains eligible for a separate non-top-ten
admissions track.1" Second, this student remains eligible for all other potential
colleges across the country. If Orentlicher's plan were implemented, neither of
these would be possible; he argues that top ten class rank should be a necessary
prerequisite to admission and that it would undermine the plan to include any
admissions track for non-top ten students.2 " It is a little troubling to ask colleg-
es to put all of their eggs in this one basket and automatically exclude the 90
percent of students who did not meet the GPA requirements.
Colleges might be less likely to adopt Orentlicher's plan to the extent that it
would leave them with severely constricted flexibility in admissions. The Texas
plan, even with its escape valves, was only possible with significant institutional
and political buy-in within a single state system.45 With a nationwide top ten
percent policy, this would be particularly difficult, since even a few non-
cooperating colleges could undermine the plan by recruiting the students in top
eleven or twelve percent of the most elite high schools.
Designing a program around the percentage of a K-12 school's students
who are FRPL-eligible would therefore be a more effective means of targeting
educational inequality and increasing K-12 integration than either granting a
bonus based on neighborhood or instituting a nationwide top ten percent plan.
C. Avoiding Intra-School Segregation
One potentially complicating factor for the policy advocated in this Note
would be if inter-school segregation was replaced by intra-school segregation
through tracking programs that segment the student body. Tracking programs
take the form of gifted, honors, or AP classes available to higher-performing
students.246 Different schools run their tracking programs differently, some us-
243. This category was the subject of the litigation in Fisher I. See Fisher v. Univ. of
Texas at Austin, 136 S.Ct. 2198, 2205-06 (2016).
244. Orentlicher, supra note 41, at 112-15. This is not an incidental feature of the pro-
posal; Orentlicher may indeed be right that given the already small number of stu-
dents that most private universities can admit, a separate non-ten-percent admis-
sions category at the national level could risk significantly diluting the pro-
integration incentive of such a plan.
245. See Guinier, supra note 26, at 161-71.
246. Tracking, which involves the placement of students in different classes, is not to be
confused with "ability grouping", a practice that is more common at the elemen-
tary level, whereby students are broken up into groups based on ability within clas-
ses. See Tom Loveless, How Well Are American Students Learning?, BROWN CTR.




ing admissions tests and others offering teachers a degree of discretion. 4 7 Such
programs could undermine some of the benefits of integrated schools, both in
terms of implicit prejudice and educational equality more generally. Studies
have shown that the presence of Allport's factors-equal group status, common
goals, intergroup cooperation, and support from authority-is optimal, though
not necessary, for intergroup contact to reduce prejudice." It would therefore
be important that tracking not reproduce segregation within schools, since such
programs could create unequal group statuses, would result in fewer common
goals and intergroup cooperation, and would signal that authority was willing
to separate these groups in ways that indicated some were more favored than
others. There are also serious equity concerns about the use of tracking, and
compelling arguments against the use of the practice in general.' 9
One solution would be for colleges to reserve this admissions bonus for
schools that did not track. While this might be a desirable outcome, it could al-
so be quite a heavy lift, as tracking is remarkably widespread; one longitudinal
study found that nearly 86 percent of middle school and high school students in
the U.S. are placed in tracked classes.2"o Another, more modest way to try to
counteract this would be for the admissions bonus to only be given to schools
that did not have a percentage of low-income students in AP classes (or their
equivalent) that was too far below their representation in the school as a
whole. 5' Students from schools that fell below this bar would not receive the
admissions bonus.
AP and honors classes are the most frequent way that schools divide their
populations and track students. And there is significant evidence that gaps in
AP participation among students of color and low-income students could be
-content/uploads/2016/06/2013-brown-center-report-web-3.pdf [http://perma
.cc/BV3V-62NW] (differentiating the two).
247. See, e.g., Maureen T. Hallinan, Tracking: From Theory to Practice, 67 Soc. EDUC.
79, 79-80 (1994) (describing the wide variety of ways in which schools utilize
tracking); Loveless, supra note 243, at 13-20.
248. Pettigrew & Tropp, supra note 171, at 753; see also Robert E. Slavin & Robert
Cooper, Improving Intergroup Relations: Lessons Learned From Cooperative Learn-
ingPrograms, 55 J. Soc..IsSuES 647 (1999).
249. See JOHN HATTIE, VISIBLE LEARNING: A SYNTHESIS OF OVER 800 META-ANALYSES
RELATING TO ACHIEVEMENT 89-91 (2009). Hattie's seminal work on meta-analyses
of educational achievement details the results of a meta-analysis of "300 studies of
tracking, covering a wide variety of schooling cultures and experiences, in most
curriculum subjects, across all age ranges, and across most major educational out-
comes .... The results show that tracking has minimal effects on learning out-
comes and profound negative equity effects." Id. at 90.
250. Id. at 89.
251. The actual threshold here would necessarily be somewhat arbitrary, but would
need to balance ensuring real integration of AP classrooms with potential differ-
ences in achievement between groups.
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remedied without altering admissions standards. There is currently a great deal
of "under-matching" along race and class lines, where students who are deemed
likely to succeed in AP classes in a particular subject (based on their perfor-
mance on the PSAT, which the College Board finds to be the strongest predictor
of success on the AP exam) do not end up taking any AP classes."' The College
Board found that the greatest potential being lost was among African-American
and Native American students; for those groups, only three out of ten students
take the AP science class for which they showed potential.5 3 There is similar
under-participation along socioeconomic lines.25 4 Various schools have been
working to try to close these gaps, and certain states have succeeded." Other
approaches, such as one school's switch to mandatory application of the test
used to select students for participation in gifted programs led to a significant
increase in low-income students without a change in admission standards."'
There is therefore good reason to believe improvement and increased participa-
tion in AP or other tracking programs is quite feasible.
Schools that wished to make their students eligible for this admissions
boost would provide information on the percentage of their students who are
FRPL-eligible (information that is also publicly available) and the percentage of
those students in their relevant tracking programs. If there were too great a dis-
crepancy between those numbers, the school could be given either a reduced
bonus or none at all.
Nonetheless, while some of the most conspicuous and harmful forms of in-
tra-school segregation could be controlled for, it is unlikely that it would be
possible to closely monitor and prevent schools from employing creative means
to segregate their own students. Some degree of good faith (though, as noted
above, not necessarily sacrifice) on the part of schools and educators would
therefore be necessary in order for this policy to have an optimal effect.
A related concern might be that if K-12 schools, in order to accrue the ad-
missions benefit for their students, were to begin admitting low-income stu-
dents, these students might be treated solely as placeholders, which would un-
dermine the value of intergroup contact. An analogous argument has long been
252. COLLEGEBOARD, The 10th Annual AP Report to the Nation 27-29 (Feb. 11, 2014),
http://media.collegeboard.com/digitalServices/pdf/ap/rtn/lOth-annual/10th
-annual-ap-report-to-the-nation-single-page.pdf [http://perma.cc/4T4D-UP3S].
253. Id. at 29.
254. Id.
255. Id. at 33-37.
256. David Card & Laura Giuliano, Can Universal Screening Increase the Representation
of Low Income and Minority Students in Gifted Education? (Nat'l Bureau of Econ.





raised about affirmative action at the college level," 57 and variants of the argu-
ment have dogged attempts at integration from the outset. Though the psycho-
logical environment that such a program might create in schools across the
country is a question that merits a more in-depth examination than can be pro-
vided here, and would likely require a certain degree of empirical study, I will
offer several preliminary responses here. First, even assuming that this potential
risk exists, it should be measured against the alternative, which would be to
push for integration only to the extent that wealthier schools and students
would consider it to be "merited." The current re-segregation in our schools is
testament to the insufficiency of this approach. Furthermore, as the literature
on under-matching suggests, there are significant numbers of high-performing
low-income students who meet the standards for advanced classes but who are
currently left behind. The fact that other students might have incorrect assump-
tions about these students' abilities-assumptions that the social science litera-
ture on implicit bias indicates would be challenged by greater contact-does
not seem a worthy reason to refrain from attempting to change both the setting
and the presumptions. Lastly, to the extent that this program is being proposed
to colleges that already employ affirmative action programs that have faced the
same critique, these institutions generally recognize that the pedagogical values
of diversity and integration overshadow the potential unintended consequences
of affirmative action.
D. How This Policy Would Interact with Current Affirmative Action Pro-
grams
By using FRPL eligibility and aiming to reduce intra-school segregation,
this proposal seeks to align the institutional interests of colleges with wider so-
cial objectives; the value of admitting students who attended class-integrated
schools depends on the metric for integration being accurate and measuring
true integration as distinct from intra-school segregation. However, when we
turn to the question of how.this program would coexist alongside existing af-
firmative action programs, a tension becomes more visible. This tension con-
sists of two interrelated questions: first, how will this program coexist with ex-
isting college affirmative action programs? Second, should there be a percentage
of FRPL-eligible students above which a school should no longer receive an
admissions bonus designed in part to reflect the benefits of integration?
The most conceptually neat answer would be to say that this program
would consist in an admissions bonus given to students from schools that fell
within a range of FRPL-eligible students, say from forty to sixty percent.
Though this would mean that students who attended the most impoverished
schools would not benefit from this boost, this program would coexist along-
257. See, e.g., STEPHEN L. CARTER, REFLECTIONS OF AN AFFIRMATIVE ACTION BABY 47-98
(1992) (describing, among other things, the ways in which perceptions that an in-
dividual has benefitted from affirmative action can be harmful).
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side existing affirmative action programs that tend to benefit those students."'
Under this approach, the relationship between a college's desire to admit stu-
dents who attended integrated schools and the metric is intuitively clearer. In
addition, the absolute harm may be low, since perhaps few of those students
would have been rendered competitive on the traditional metrics of college ad-
mission by this bonus in the first place. Though this is a potentially viable form
for this program to take, I nevertheless do not find it altogether satisfying. There
is something troubling about the idea of a program that aims to address ine-
quality that then comparatively disadvantages those in the worst-off schools. In
addition, to limit the extent of this disadvantage, the size of this boost would
have to be relatively limited in comparison to existing affirmative action pro-
grams. This would commensurately reduce the benefits of this program for
both colleges and K- 12 schools. And finally, as I will argue below, societal bene-
fits and to a certain extent institutional benefits would be more effectively pur-
sued by not placing an upper bound on the percentage of FRPL-eligible stu-
dents used as a metric in this program.
Yet it is undeniable that there is, at the very least, a seeming tension be-
tween arguing that colleges should give an admissions boost based partly on the
benefits of having attended an integrated school, only to employ a metric that
includes schools that are overwhelmingly composed of students eligible for
FRPL and thus not socioeconomically integrated. What would account for the
seeming asymmetry between excluding non-integrated schools that are affluent,
but including those that are poor?
To understand the rationale, it is useful to step back and take into account
the larger stated purpose of affirmative action: promoting diversity. From this
standpoint, it is in the interest of colleges to avoid implementing a program that
would reduce the representation of already underrepresented groups. After all,
the goal of diversity on campus is not just creating an inclusive environment
but also bringing together students from different class backgrounds. It would
certainly not improve diversity on campus to admit a class of only affluent,
white students who had attended class-integrated schools. Any proposal that
would reduce the representation of a group that is already severely underrepre-
sented would be counter-productive from the perspective of increasing diversi-
ty. Excluding non-integrated schools of mostly affluent students from the bo-
nus program does not trigger this counter-productive effect. Including schools
with a significant majority of FRPL-eligible students, on the other hand, allows
258. Though a program giving a boost to students from integrated schools might in
some ways conflict with the Ten Percent programs that some state schools have
adopted, this is not a significant concern for two reasons. First, Ten Percent pro-
grams are only feasible for large state institutions. Second, any large-scale effort to
integrate K-12 schools might eventually conflict with Ten Percent programs,
which are predicated on the existence of de facto segregation. Surely it cannot be
the case that all attempts to integrate schools should be stopped in their tracks be-
cause of potential down-the-road conflicts with Ten Percent programs.
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colleges to balance an effort to increase inclusion while maintaining a critical
mass of students from underrepresented SES backgrounds.
Furthermore, one of the main reasons for this program is to update college
admissions criteria to reflect modem social science research on prejudicial atti-
tudes and beliefs. This research tells us that intergroup contact can help reduce
out-group stereotypes (stereotypes about other groups), but it also indicates
that groups continually exposed to negative stereotypes will to a certain extent
internalize those views.' 9 This produces "in-group prejudice," in which groups
internalize stereotypes about themselves and other members of their in-
group.260 Presumably because of the impact of exposure to negative stereotypes,
it can in certain specific circumstances be easier to combat in-group prejudice
in non-integrated educational settings."' However, this effect is observed only
for groups already on the wrong side of societal assumptions. While female stu-
dents taught by and around women are more likely than those in mixed-gender
settings to maintain a positive perception of their own mathematical ability, for
example, male students' self-reports of mathematical ability do not increase
when they are taught predominantly by and around men."' Reducing in-group
negative stereotypes would also be useful to the overall goal of promoting inclu-
sion, as this can be one of the most pernicious effects of stigmatization. Colleges
should not disadvantage parents and children who for this reason sought out
schools that historically served underprivileged groups. It may well be the case
that the in-group bias reductions do not obtain in all non-integrated educa-
tional environments, and these benefits do not outweigh the larger benefits of
integrated schools. Rather than being conclusive, the recent findings on these
questions simply suggest other reasons for treating predominantly low-income
schools differently from high-income ones.
In addition, the general benefits of promoting K-12 integration would bet-
ter be served by using a threshold (above 40%) rather than a range (40-60%).
Schools with mostly students from low-income households that are trying to
attract students from more affluent households would be unlikely to attract sig-
nificant numbers overnight. Extending this benefit to them in general would
allow them to overcome what might otherwise be a serious coordination prob-
lem. This would be true at one end of the income spectrum and not the other,
since affluent schools will have significantly greater material enticements that
they can offer to parents and students from poorer households. Therefore, it
would be important to provide this incentive while poorer schools make incre-
mental gains in integration. For the same reason, it is important that the benefit
only kick in once currently non-integrated affluent schools pass a certain
threshold. It is therefore likely that promoting integrated schools can be done






YALE LAW & POLICY REVIEW
more effectively by rewarding students from some schools that predominantly
serve families of the same income level, but doing so only for such schools that
are predominantly low-income.
A final note: If this program becomes part of a "holistic" affirmative action
policy, it may not be as necessary to put exact numbers on how large the class-
integrated school bonus is or who exactly would receive it. Indeed, some admis-
sions departments are already taking the relevant factors into account to some
degree.26 3 Though this might smooth out some of the tensions, it would reduce
the visibility of the program as well as the ability of parents to take it into ac-
count, both of which would reduce the attractiveness of the idea. It would be
necessary for colleges to credibly and conspicuously assert that this factor would
receive particularly significant consideration in a holistic evaluation, since it is
unlikely that a nebulous bonus would be the optimal form for this policy.
Though the question of threshold versus range is a complicated conceptual
one, it may be that the practical effects of this decision are not particularly sig-
nificant given the analysis above. Both approaches are different paths to the
same result: Ensuring that in adopting this program, colleges do not reduce the
number of students they are admitting from schools that serve the most impov-
erished communities. Thus, this program could be viable either way, though
again, there are several reasons to think a threshold would be optimal from
both the institutional and social perspective.
For the reasons outlined above, I believe that the optimal version of this
plan would be to grant an admissions bonus to students who for at least six
years attended a school where over forty percent of students were FRPL-eligible.
This program would be implemented alongside or in coordination with existing
race- or SES-based affirmative action programs in such a way that students
from racial or class backgrounds currently underrepresented would continue to
receive a boost in admissions, while students from racial or class backgrounds
that are overrepresented in colleges could receive a less substantial boost for
having attended class-integrated schools.
IV. WHY SUCH A POLICY WOULD BE CONSTITUTIONAL
As is often the case with affirmative action programs, to evaluate this poli-
cy, we must also ask if it would be constitutional. In this section, I will compare
the constitutionality of two potential versions of this program, one in which
applicants receive a bonus based on the racial composition of the K-12 schools
they attended, and one in which applicants receive a bonus based on the SES
composition of their K-12 schools. At the college level, both of the plans are
race-neutral with respect to the individual applicant herself. However, the first
form might raise more serious constitutional questions if K-12 schools took in-
to account the race of students in admissions in an attempt to qualify for the
bonus-especially if it seemed like these schools were instituting something




along the lines of a quota. Both plans are also to a certain degree race-conscious
in their goals: in both cases, if the plans failed to result over time in both a
greater representation of historically underrepresented groups in higher educa-
tion as well as less racial segregation at the K-12 level, then they could not be
considered successful.
A. The Legal Landscape Post-Fisher II: Stuck in the Grutter
The Court's jurisprudence on affirmative action stretches from Bakke,2 4
through Grutter,"I Parents Involved,266 and now to Fisher 11.267 How would a
version of this program that took into account the racial composition of an ap-
plicant's K-12 schools fare in the legal landscape created by the Court's decision
in Fisher IR There is, perhaps unsurprisingly, some debate over what the legacy
of Fisher II will be for affirmative action. For opponents of race-based affirma-
tive action, it means "racial preferences forever""' and "affirmative action gone
berserk.""9 Some supporters may have been just as surprised, as Justice Kenne-
dy "had never previously voted to uphold a race-based affirmative action pro-
gram against a constitutional challenge."2 70 Yet to the extent that the Fisher II
decision consciously sees itself as upholding the precedent set by Grutter, this
"shocker" of a decision is unlikely to have a major impact on affirmative action
programs using race. For the time being, then, the legal doctrine appears to be
stuck in the Grutter framework.
264. Regents of the Univ. of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
265. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
266. Parents Involved in Cmty. Schools v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701 (2007).
267. Fisher v. Univ. of Texas at Austin (Fisher 11), 136 S. Ct. 2198, 2205-06 (2016).
268. Stuart Taylor, Symposium: Extrapolating from Fisher - Racial Preferences Forever,
SCOTUSBLOG (June 23, 2016, 4:42 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2016/06/
symposium-extrapolating-from-fisher-racial-preferences-forever [http://perma
.cc/4UL6-NPCQ].
269. Mark Walsh, A "View" from the Courtroom: Alito Dissents on Affirmative Action, a
Deadlock on Immigration, and More, SCOTUSBLOG, (June 23, 2016, 5:31 PM),
http://www.scotusblog.com/2016/06/a-view-from-the-courtroom-alito-dissents
-on-affirmative-action-a-deadlock-on-immigration-and-more [http://perma.cc/
Y9CS-NFTC] (quoting Justice Alito's off-hand remark as he read his opinion from
the bench).
270. Steve Vladeck, Symposium: So What Happened Between Fisher I and Fisher II?,
SCOTUSBLOG (June 23, 2016, 12:53 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2016/06/
symposium-so-what-happened-between-fisher-i-and-fisher-ii/ [http://perma.cc/
4ZP2-V8MJ].
271. Richard Kahlenberg, Symposium: A Win for Wealthy Students, SCOTUSBLOG,
(June 23, 2016, 9:10 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2016/06/symposium-a-win
-for-wealthy-students/ [http://perma.cc/TBN3-DC8A].
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The Grutter framework, expressly preserved by Fisher II, sanctions the use
of race in affirmative action to promote compelling state interests, so long as
such programs are narrowly tailored to achieve those ends. 7'2 Failure to narrow-
ly tailor means running afoul of constitutional equal protection. The Court held
that it would give "some, but not complete" deference to colleges' determina-
tion of the educational benefits of student diversity.n7 And, drawing again on
previous cases, Grutter expressly allows certain ends as "compelling state inter-
ests": "the destruction of stereotypes, the 'promot[ion of] cross-racial under-
standing,' the preparation of a student body 'for an increasingly diverse work-
force and society,' and the 'cultivat[ion of] a set of leaders with legitimacy in the
eyes of the citizenry."'
7 4
However, the Court also found that no deference is owed to the college it-
self in determining whether the use of race has been "narrowly tailored" to meet
these compelling state ends. 75 One thing this means is a requirement that the
college demonstrate that the same compelling interests could not be promoted
by programs that do not employ racial classifications-which are not exactly
the same thing as programs that take no account of race. The Court has ex-
pressed concerns about potential perverse effects of well-meaning racial classifi-
cations. Poorly designed programs could "fail to capture diversity in all of its
dimensions" or even, "when used in a divisive manner, could undermine the
educational benefits" themselves.7' This concern about divisiveness stems from
the same grounds on which Justice Kennedy has supported certain race con-
scious programs that seek to increase racial integration; social cohesion is un-
dermined both by de facto racial segregation in education and by blunt reme-
dies through which individuals are told that they are being judged based on
their race./ 7 There are crucial differences between this approach and either of
what are often referred to as the "anti-subordination" and the "colorblind" un-
derstandings of the requirements of constitutional equal protection.7
In contrast to the simple versions of the anti-subordination account of con-
stitutional equal protection, the Court's concern about "balkanization" (under-
stood as the idea that raising the salience of certain identities can increase social
distance among groups) implies that certain policies aimed at remedying racial
272. See Fisher II, 136 S.Ct. at 2207-09.
273. Id. at 2203 (quoting Fisher 1, 133 S. Ct. 2411, 2419 (2013)).
274. Id. at 2211 (quoting University's 2004 "Proposal to Consider Race and Ethnicity in
Admissions").
275. Id. at 2208 (quoting Fisher 1, 133 S. Ct. at.242 1).
276. Id. at 2210.
277. Reva B. Siegel, From Colorblindness to Antibalkanization: An Emerging Ground of
Decision in Race Equality Cases, 120 YALE L.J. 1278, 1306-07 (2011).




inequality can be unconstitutional despite their integrative purpose. 7 9 At the
same time, unlike a basic version of the "colorblind" account of equal protec-
tion, this anti-balkanization jurisprudence continues to treat race-classifying
programs that seek to benefit underrepresented racial minorities differently
from those that would benefit racial groups that are already overrepresented.28
The fear that racial stratification could produce balkanization is relatively
straightforward. It presumes that a lack of racial diversity in higher education
and the de facto segregation of the nation's K-12 schools tend to decrease inter-
group understanding and increase racial fault lines, but also that the perverse
effects of programs to remedy racial inequality in education may outweigh their
good intentions."' The Court has articulated these doubts in several different
ways.
In Parents Involved, five Justices agreed that policies that "endorse race-
based reasoning and the conception of a Nation divided into racial blocs" can
"contribut[e] to an escalation of racial hostility and conflict.""' Justice Kennedy
also notes in Parents Involved that these policies sow "new divisiveness" and
feed a "corrosive discourse" by making race into a "bargaining chip in the polit-
ical process."283 This concern is the most straightforwardly cognizable along the
anti-balkanization framework discussed above; classifying individuals by race
can mean essentializing and entrenching race as a category in a way that raises
the level of antagonism between racial groups, whose members will fight over
benefits allocated by race.284
The Court has also voiced concerns about how the message communicated
by race-classifying policies might intrude on individuals' dignity and autonomy.
In Parents Involved, Justice Kennedy notes that: "Under our Constitution the
individual, child or adult, can find his own identity, can define her own perso-
na, without state intervention that classifies on the basis of his race or the color
of her skin."'5 This is a concern that "state-mandated racial label[s]" that indi-
viduals are "powerless to change" impede an individual's ability to determine
her own life."
Both of these concerns include a fundamentally communicative element,
and a conviction that "race-conscious measures that do not rely on differential
treatment based on individual classifications present these problems to a lesser
279. Id. at 1300-03.
280. Id. at 1300-01.
281. Id. at 1300-03.
282. Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 746 (2007)
(quoting Metro Broad., Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 603 (1990)).
283. Id. at 797 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
284. See id.
285. Id.
286. Id. at 743.
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degree." 11 Because these problems arise when programs broadcast a message
out into society that either increases antagonism between racial groups or tells
an individual that they will forever be defined by their race, indirection will re-
duce these harms by scrambling the message. This is why, under the existing
doctrine, holistic treatment of an applicant's race is constitutionally preferred to
mechanical treatment of those same classifications, and why facially race-
neutral but race-conscious policies are constitutionally preferable to policies
that classify individuals based on race. However, what is interesting about this
framework is that it seems just as (if not more) concerned about the intelligibil-
ity of the message communicated than about its content. For example, both a
mechanical and a holistic affirmative action program that take race into account
could be understood as expressing the same basic message: because an institu-
tion wishes to admit a more diverse student body, an applicant will be evaluated
such that her race may count in her favor or not. The difference lies in how sali-
ent and intelligible this message is for applicants; the benefit of a mechanical in-
crease in points is far easier to grasp, while the specific benefit of a holistic pro-
cess will remain more opaque. This difference is sometimes also justified on the
grounds that mechanical weighting of race does not treat applicants like indi-
viduals, in a way that prejudices their autonomy or dignity. However, this relies
on an assumption that when a large institution like a college adjudges an appli-
cant in part based on her race, this does not pose constitutionally invalidating
harms to her autonomy and dignity so long as she (or perhaps anyone) is una-
ware of how much weight was given to her race.
This jurisprudence rests on the idea that while racial inequality is an urgent
problem, "both racial stratification and its repair each have the potential to bal-
kanize."' And thus "the nation must strive for new, effective approaches that
eschew the shortcomings of prior policies."28 Yet by keeping Grutter's model,
Fisher II has actually provided little impetus for colleges to shift their policies.
Rather, the Court has preserved a safe harbor out of which colleges may be un-
derstandably uneasy about straying. Thus, Fisher II will do little to change the
fact that "the educational advantage that the wealthy enjoy in higher education
contributes to declining economic mobility." 29 0
It is not solely the Court's affirmative action jurisprudence that calls out for
new approaches, but the reality on the ground that students from low-income
backgrounds are increasingly underrepresented on college campuses. 9' And as
constraining as the Court's doctrine is for race-conscious affirmative action
programs of the traditional form, it leaves open more room than has heretofore
287. Id. at 797.
288. Siegel, supra note 277, at 1300.
289. Erman & Walton, supra note 70, at 340 (citing Siegel, supra note 277).
290. Brown-Nagin, supra note 6, at 467.




been used. To the extent that current policies leave much to be desired, colleges
should seek to explore what more they can do.
B. A Program Focused on SES Would Be Constitutional
Under the currently applicable line of cases, a program that used the per-
centage of FRLP-eligible students in an applicant's K-12 schools to calculate an
admissions bonus would almost certainly pass muster under the Court's equal
protection jurisprudence. 92 Nor would such a plan lead to constitutionally
worrisome behavior on the part of K-12 schools if they were, as we would hope,
to select students based on SES in response to this plan. Students would not be
being told that they were being favored based on their race, but rather their par-
ents' income, a message that would not trigger strict scrutiny. 293
If such a program instead gave an admissions bonus based on the racial
composition of an applicant's K-12 schools, more difficult constitutional ques-
tions could be raised. It might initially seem that because this program involves
a similar degree of indirectness, it could survive scrutiny: Individuals are not
being evaluated based on their race, but based on the experiences they likely had
at more racially integrated schools. This might assuage the communicative, dig-
nity, and autonomy concerns underlying the Court's doctrine. In addition, such
a program fits many of the goals that Fisher II identifies as compelling state in-
terests, primarily by increasing a sense of inclusion on college campuses. 9 4
This would not, however, be enough to bring this program into the clear. It
would also be important that this program would not risk causing K- 12 schools
to engage in unconstitutional behavior. The same equal protection framework
that the Court has applied to college admissions applies to K-12 schools, and
the Court has struck down K-12 policies employing racial classifications in se-
lecting their student bodies when it found they were not narrowly tailored to
the schools' compelling interests in diversity. 95
K-12 schools seeking to reach a percentage of students of certain racial/
ethnic groups to meet the standards for a program based on that metric could
still admit students in a "holistic" manner. Parents Involved leaves open several
other possibilities by which K- 12 schools could aim to increase racial diversity,
including drawing attendance zones with an understanding of neighborhood
demographics or recruiting students in a targeted fashion.29' However, in order
292. Indeed, a primary question in Fisher II was whether presumptively constitutional
socioeconomic affirmative action would have been sufficient to accomplish the
University of Texas' objectives. See 136 S. Ct. at 2213.
293. See San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 25-29 (1973).
294. Fisher II, 136 S. Ct. at 2212.
295. Parents Involved, 551 U.S. 701, 733 (2007) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part, con-
curring in the judgment).
296. Id. at 789.
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for the program advocated in this piece to be practicable, it would almost cer-
tainly be necessary for K-12 schools to have a solid metric they could target.
This could begin to resemble a forbidden racial quota; after all, while educa-
tional institutions can pursue a nebulous "critical mass" of students from cer-
tain racial/ethnic backgrounds, they are expressly forbidden from trying to
achieve a specific percentage of such students. 97 Here again, the line between
when the communicative danger renders a policy unconstitutional and when it
does not is extremely fine. Under existing doctrine, there is a significant consti-
tutional difference between the race-conscious targeted recruitment of students,
race-conscious holistic application policies, and race-conscious mechanistic
admissions policies-even if these three policies were to have similar outcomes
in terms of the racial composition of the student body. The difference again
rests on the communicative element, and the risk that the audience of broader
society would understand the same message ("X school should have more stu-
dents from Y racial backgrounds") differently-or perhaps more accurately,
would understand it at all-when it was more or less direct.
Thus, while the actions of colleges in creating an incentive for such behav-
ior might not necessarily be unconstitutional given the degrees of separation,
for K- 12 schools to respond to such an incentive by pursuing what looks like a
racial quota might raise real constitutional concerns. Since changing the behav-
ior of such schools is the principal reason for pursuing such a program, defining
the metric in this way would be a significant drawback. In order to have the
hoped-for effect on wider societal behavior, it would be important for it to be
straightforward enough that parents, K-12 schools, and colleges be able to un-
derstand relatively easily which K-12 schools would and wouldn't qualify for
the bonus. Relying on using SES rather than race would avoid the potentially
serious constitutional concerns that might otherwise arise.
CONCLUSION
The proposal outlined in this paper offers a novel solution for a pressing
problem: How can colleges work to reduce or reverse their role in increasing
inequality in a way that would be institutionally, politically, and legally feasible?
By adopting such a program, particularly if they did so in a coordinated man-
ner, colleges could use their privileged position in society as a source of educa-
tional norms to shift the behavior and improve the educations of a greater
number of low-income students than these institutions are presently prepared
to admit. In addition to representing an important step in doing more to live up
to their broader social commitments, there is substantial social science evidence
indicating that adopting such a program could help foster an atmosphere of in-
clusion on campuses, which is itself vital to the pedagogical benefits of diversity
that colleges have long extolled. This policy would also be relatively inexpensive
for colleges to adopt and, so long as it was based on SES rather than race, it




would likely be constitutional under the Court's existing affirmative action doc-
trine.
At a time when educational inequality contributes to rising economic ine-
quality, colleges should act proactively to reduce their role in this process and to
encourage integration throughout the educational system. The policy described
in this piece offers them an inexpensive, legal, and effective means to do so.
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